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REPRESENTATION IN CONTEXT: PARTY POWER AND LAWYER EXPERTISE 
 
Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter, and Alyx Mark* 
 
The questions when, why, and how legal representation makes a difference for 
parties in civil litigation remain largely unanswered, although recent scholarship raises 
compelling new questions and suggests new explanations and theoretical approaches.  
Understanding how legal representation operates, we argue, requires an appreciation for 
the context in which the representation actually takes place.  This article examines two 
previously unexplored elements of the context of legal representation through empirical 
and theoretical analysis: the balance of power between the parties to a dispute and the 
professional, specifically strategic, expertise that a legal representative contributes.  The 
results of a study of 1,700 unemployment compensation cases in the District of 
Columbia’s central administrative court reveal two key findings.  First, represented 
parties have better case outcomes than unrepresented parties, though employers – the 
more powerful party to a dispute or the quintessential “haves” – see less benefit from 
legal representation than claimants – the less powerful party or the “have nots.”  Second, 
represented parties are more likely to use procedures than unrepresented parties.  Yet, 
surprisingly, represented claimants who use certain evidentiary procedures have worse 
case outcomes than represented claimants who do not use those same procedures. Thus, 
in attempting to answer the question of when, why, and how legal representation makes a 
difference, we argue that it depends on who the represented party is, who they are up 
against, and the expertise the representative brings. 
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Advocacy, scholarship, and court action are currently focused on critical needs in 
civil representation in the United States.  Despite this focus, we are still unable to answer 
a fundamental question: when do civil litigants need a lawyer to effectively participate in 
our justice system?1  In part, this ongoing quest is the result of the incomplete 
development of empirical research—much existing research is focused on the outcome of 
cases with little exploration of how those outcomes are reached.  And in equal part, this 
quest continues because we have not yet fully developed theories that explain the 
effectiveness of representation.2  This article attempts to provide both theoretical 
grounding and empirical analysis of when, why, and how representation matters.  We 
believe these core questions can only be understood – and we can only make good legal 
and policy decisions about when civil litigants should have lawyers – by investigating 
legal representation in context.  We begin to engage in the complexity of studying 
representation in context by moving beyond the question of whether a litigant wins when 
she has a lawyer.  To do this, we investigate how the balance of power between the 
parties interacts with representation and ask exactly what expertise a lawyer lends to the 
civil litigation process. 
                                                
1 See Catherine Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 
Wis. L. Rev. 101, 106 (2013); Jeffrey Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
145, 159-161 (2013); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal 
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 
2125-26 (2012); Jeffrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery, 
Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 54 (2012). 
2 See generally Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 1 (offering an access to justice research agenda that is 
theory-driven and explores a broad range of issues related to civil justice); Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting 
“Is” and “Ought” in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2013) (calling for legal 
scholars to develop and be explicit about normative goals in empirical research and noting that “intuition 
alone cannot suffice to relate observable data to normative claims; legal scholarship needs conceptual 
frameworks and empirical methods that can bridge the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’”). 
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The site of the study is an administrative court where judges hold de novo 
hearings to resolve legal disputes between two parties, claimants seeking unemployment 
benefits and employers opposing the grant of unemployment benefits.  The units of 
observation are cases, all of which have the potential to end in a hearing and most of 
which do end in this way.  Thus, like much of the access to justice literature, this study is 
concerned with legal disputes that are formally adjudicated.3  These hearings are a 
particularly good context for examining the complexity of the value of representation 
because they have clear, binary outcomes, a variety of parties and representatives, and a 
relatively formal legal process with clear procedural steps.4   
This article relies on a data set of 1,794 unique cases.  The data encompass all 
unemployment benefit appeals in the District of Columbia in 2012 where the 
circumstances of separation are at issue, regardless of which parties appeared at the 
hearing.  The data for each case includes extensive coding regarding the circumstances 
and activities in the case, including the fact and type of representation, the presence of a 
representative at the hearing, the presence of parties at the hearing, the participation of 
parties in different procedural steps of the hearing process, and the procedural and 
                                                
3 Most empirical studies on access to justice focus on civil justice problems that actually reach a lawyer’s 
attention and become formal cases in the justice system, a focus that Albiston and Sandefur have 
challenged because it leaves out the vast majority of civil justice problems that never actually come to the 
attention of a lawyer, let alone an adjudicator. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 1, at 109. 
4 It is common, when writing about administrative hearings, for scholars and policy-makers to assert that 
the quasi-inquisitorial nature of these hearings, where many parties are pro se, representation is rare, and 
the rules of evidence and procedure are relaxed, is a departure from the regular operation of civil courts. 
See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 1, at 2137.  It might be suggested that the applicability of a study 
such as this is limited given the differences between administrative hearings and city and county civil 
courts.  However, the reality of the day-to-day operations of our civil justice system suggests this claim is 
overstated.  The vast majority of litigants in civil cases are unrepresented and even a brief observation at 
any of our nation’s workhorse civil courts will reveal that hearings in these settings are often no less 
inquisitorial in nature, the rules of evidence and procedure are similarly relaxed (or ignored), and 
representation is incredibly rare.  Although the structure, and perhaps the dream, of the adversarial system 
are more visible in our civil justice system, it is certainly not the case that inquisitorial judging is a rarity in 
America today.  For that reason and others, we argue that the results of this study have wider applicability 
than the administrative appeals setting. 
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substantive outcomes of the cases.  The data for this project will ultimately include three 
years of data and more than twenty different procedural steps, though this article focuses 
on only a subset of this data.  This data set is larger in the number of cases collected than 
many recent empirical studies of representation, and has broader data collected about 
each case than previous studies. 
Our first finding from this examination of representation in context is that less 
powerful parties gain more from representation than more powerful parties do.  To test 
theories of balance power and representation, we ask whether one or both parties have 
lawyers, and then investigate the case outcomes across variation in balance of power and 
balance of representation.  The data show that representation makes a difference, 
especially for claimants and especially for claimants when employers are not represented.  
Interestingly, claimants also benefit from representation when both parties are 
represented.  In this context, the employer generally is the party with more power and 
corresponds with the “haves” in the civil justice system, while the claimant is the party 
with less power and corresponds with the “have nots.”5  As a result, we argue that while 
legal representation may offer advantages for anyone who can secure it, the benefit that 
flows from a representative’s legal expertise is greatest for those who can least afford 
representation because the “haves” can acquire and use elements of legal expertise,6 even 
without actual representation.  Thus when the “have nots” face the “haves” in a civil legal 
setting and without representation, they are at a disadvantage.  If representation can shift 
                                                
5 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95,160 (1974) (dividing parties in the civil legal system into “repeat players” 
and “one-shotters” and describing how well-resourced repeat players – the “haves” – gain advantage in 
litigation against one-shotters – the “have nots”). 
6 Id. at 98.  In this article, we will use the terms “legal expertise” and “professional expertise” 
interchangeably. 
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the power dynamic in the civil legal setting, as we suggest it does, this raises the question 
of what lawyers are doing to make this shift. 
Our second finding is that what representatives do to help parties is more complex 
and dependent on context than simply using the available law or procedure.  Our data 
reveal that while all represented parties are more likely to appear at a hearing and use 
evidentiary steps than unrepresented parties, represented employers who use these steps 
have better case outcomes than represented employers who do not use the same 
procedures.  In contrast, represented claimants who use certain evidentiary steps have 
comparatively worse case outcomes than represented claimants who do not use the same 
procedures.  This finding is surprising because it challenges basic assumptions about how 
lawyers use law and procedure to help their clients.  As discussed more fully below, this 
finding suggests a variety of explanations, including the interaction of use of procedures 
with substantive legal burdens, the nature of representation in this study’s context, and 
the signaling function of lawyers.  We argue that one important explanation is a lawyer’s 
strategic expertise, an important and previously uninvestigated component of 
representation.  If lawyers potentially contribute three types of expertise: substantive, 
relational, and strategic, the concept of strategic expertise captures how lawyers make 
choices by synthesizing the rules that govern their work and the informal relationships 
they navigate in the course of that work.  All of these potential explanations will benefit 
from more research, underscoring our argument that it is not sufficient to ask whether a 
party is represented; we must also ask what the representative is doing for the party.  In 
short, to understand representation we must examine it in context. 
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II. Previous Studies and Theories of Representation 
This study builds on existing scholarship in two areas: empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of representation and the development of theories of power, representation 
and expertise. 
A. Previous Empirical Studies 
Existing research overwhelmingly concludes that parties with representation fare 
better in legal disputes than those who are not represented.7  Other studies have attempted 
to answer the question of whether representation matters in general and in the same 
context – unemployment insurance appeals – as this study.8   
Previous studies of unemployment appeals have engaged in questions of the 
effectiveness of representation by comparing success rates of claimants with 
representation to those of claimants without representation.9  All of these studies, save for 
the most recent one, reach the conclusion that representation improves a claimant’s 
probability of winning, and these same studies also suggest that there are advantages to 
representation by non-lawyers, such as paralegals, law students, and lay representatives.10   
                                                
7 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 51, 69 (2010) [hereinafter Sandefur, Impact of Counsel] As discussed below, we acknowledge 
that one study does not support this assumption and believe others have adequately discussed the limits of 
that study.   
8 See Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel, supra note 7, at 70-71.  See also Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of 
Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 453 (2011) (examining the effectiveness of unbundled legal services). 
9 See Greiner & Pattanyak supra note 1, at 2124; HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND 
NONLAWYERS AT WORK 33-34 (1998) [hereinafter KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY]; Maurice Emsellem & 
Monica Halas, Representation of Claimants at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings: Identifying 
Models and Proposed Solutions, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 291 (1996); Murray Rubin, The Appeals 
System, in 3 NAT’L COMM’N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMP., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: STUDIES AND 
RESEARCH 625 (1980). 
10 See KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9 at 76-77; Sandefur, Impact of Counsel, supra note 7 at 79. 
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In a 1980 study, Rubin used national data to create a baseline observation of 
unemployment insurance appeal hearings.  This study examined cases where the parties 
appeared at hearings and found representation rates for both parties of less than 10% and 
overall claimant win rates of 35.7%, regardless of representation.11  Further, the Rubin 
study found that claimants won 30.8% of cases where employers appeared, but 45.4% of 
cases where employers appeared and the claimant was represented, and 49.3% of cases 
where both parties were represented.12 
In a 1995 study, Emsellem and Halas analyzed data from unemployment 
insurance appeals in Ohio and found employers were represented four times (45%) as 
often as claimants (10%).13  The study found that unrepresented claimants won 34% of 
cases and represented claimants won 45% of cases.14     
Kritzer’s 1998 study examined unemployment insurance appeal data in Wisconsin, 
and for the first time parsed the data according to which party appealed and which party 
had the burden of proof, though the analysis was restricted to cases where both parties 
appeared for the hearing.15  Kritzer found that representation made no difference for 
employers (winning approximately 58% of cases whether represented or not), but that 
unrepresented claimants won 41.5% of cases and represented claimants won 50.4% of 
cases.16  Further, Kritzer found that when both sides brought a representative, claimants 
won 44.6% of cases, when representation was imbalanced in favor of the claimant, 
                                                
11 Rubin, supra note 9, at 628. 
12 Rubin, supra note 9, at 628. 
13 Emsellem & Halas, supra note 9, at 292. 
14 Emsellem & Halas, supra note 9, at 292.  It is not clear whether this study included all appeals or only 
those where the parties appeared at the hearing. 
15 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 33. 
16 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 34. 
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claimants won 53.4% of cases, and when representation was imbalanced in favor of the 
employer, claimants won 41.6% of cases.17 
In the most recent study, Greiner and Pattanayak used a randomized design to 
measure the effect of an offer of representation, and found that an offer of representation 
by clinical law students does not make a significant difference in a claimant’s probability 
of winning.18  Of those claimants who received an offer of clinical law student 
representation, 76% won their cases, and of those who did not receive an offer, 72% 
won.19  The claimants who received an offer of representation waited longer for 
resolution of their case.20  In this more recent data from Massachusetts, in all cases, 
claimants won 47% of cases where the claimant appealed and 75% of cases where the 
employer appealed.21  While others have raised critiques of this study,22 several 
characteristics of the Greiner and Pattanyak study are useful for understanding this article.   
The core challenge of a non-randomized study, like the one presented in this 
article, is the effect of selection bias on the analysis of representation and case outcomes.  
For example, it may be that only the most sophisticated claimants or only employers with 
the strongest factual cases seek out representation, but there is no way of knowing the 
effect of these factors on the measured variables.  The Greiner and Pattanyak study 
                                                
17 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 34. 
18 See Greiner & Pattanyak, supra note 1. 
19 See Greiner and Pattanyak, supra note 1, at 13. 
20 Id.  
21 Greiner and Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation, supra note 1, at n.54.  It appears from the description of 
the sample for the study that while the appeals in this sample are legally de novo hearings, the process in 
these hearings is not necessarily a de novo review of the evidence.  Id. at 2136.  This difference in practice 
may lead to lower claimant win rates where claimants appeal.  
22 See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 2, at 166-67; Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 1, at 106-13; Selbin et. al, 
supra note 1, at 48-51; Bob Sable, What Difference Representation – A Response, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/what-difference-
representation-a-response.html; David Udell, What Difference Presentation?, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2011), http:// www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/what-difference-
presentation.html. 
Shanahan, Carpenter, & Mark, Representation in Context 
DRAFT - August 11, 2014 
 
 10 
overcame this challenge through randomization of the offer of representation, and relies 
heavily on its randomized design as its source of authority. We do not dispute the value 
of randomized studies, but we believe that relying solely on randomization of claimants’ 
offer of representation and then observing win rates misses important opportunities to 
understand legal representation.23  For example, Greiner and Pattanayak’s randomized 
design did not account for the ultimate representation status of claimants, whether they 
received an offer of clinical law student representation or not.  Thus, their study 
ultimately provides limited insight into the relative experiences of claimants with 
different types of representation, or no representation at all.  Similarly, the randomized 
design does not account for the representation status of the employer.  As a result, the 
study’s insight into the ultimate question of whether representation matters is also limited  
In addition, the Greiner and Pattanayak study does not investigate the level of 
participation by the parties or the representatives, including use of procedures and 
attendance at the hearing, and so does not engage in questions of what representatives 
actually do for parties.  While our study does not rely on randomized design, it does use a 
substantial data set and valid statistical methods to observe and investigate correlations at 
a breadth and depth of analysis that has not previously been conducted.  In particular, this 
article’s analysis of the correlation between parties’ use of procedural steps and case 
outcomes compares parties with the same representation status, thereby avoiding 
selection bias concerns.  In sum, this study examines the experiences of parties with 
varying types of representation and participation in a way that a randomized study cannot.  
                                                
23 See Greiner & Pattanyak, supra note 1, at 2198-220 (discussing limitations of randomized controlled 
studies). 
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B. Existing Theories of Power and Expertise 
This study is also informed by existing scholarship regarding the role lawyers 
play in civil justice settings, including theories of the balance of power and of 
professional expertise.  Scholars have developed theories of the role that lawyers play in 
civil justice settings and how representation interacts with a range of variables, including 
the area of law, the complexity of procedural rules,24 and the balance of power between 
the parties in a given dispute.   
The relative power of the parties is not the only variable that may correlate with 
representation, but it is a critical one.  While there is extensive theory about the role of 
party power in the legal system, there is limited empirical examination of this 
phenomenon.  This article is intended to supplement our empirical understanding of 
power in the legal system.  As a general matter, scholars have examined how 
socioeconomic status and social power have a relationship with a person or 
organization’s interactions with law and the justice system.25  But if the operation of law 
                                                
24 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Expertise: Lawyers’ Impact on Civil Trial and Hearing Outcomes, 
(forthcoming, copy on file with authors) at 8 [hereinafter Sandefur, Elements of Expertise]. 
25 Scholars from a range of fields, including law and sociology, have examined the relationship between the 
social power of individuals and groups and the operation of law and justice.  The idea that legal doctrine, 
by itself, does not explain how cases are handled in the legal system, and that differences may be attributed 
in some measure to the social status of the parties, can be traced back to legal realism.  In response to this 
idea, sociologists and legal scholars have attempted to explain the social factors that influence the operation 
of law.  An early work in the field of legal sociology, Donald Black’s Sociological Justice, published in 
1989, explored how the social structure of cases and the power of parties predicts the way those cases are 
handled in the legal system.  Black argued that law is “situational” and “relative” and explained how law 
varies with social status.  He proposed that high status and low status parties experience the legal system 
differently as a baseline matter and noted that the treatment of a given case may be predicted by looking at 
the balance of power between parties.  See generally BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989).  More 
recently and in the context of access to justice literature, sociologist Rebecca Sandefur examined empirical 
approaches to studying the relationship between civil justice and various forms of social inequality.  She 
notes: 
 
Civil justice experiences can reflect inequality in the sense that inequalities that exist 
prior to contact with or in some other way outside law and legal institutions are 
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and justice varies with social status, a full understanding of the impact of legal 
representation requires understanding the status of each party to a dispute and their status 
relative to each other.26   
A corollary issue is the symbolic effect of a powerful party.  Others have 
theorized and investigated how a party’s social status or power has a signaling function in 
the legal system.27  Scholars have theorized how individuals and businesses who have (or 
are perceived to have) higher status and better reputations are likely to be perceived more 
positively by judges and other court staff.28  Along the same lines, representatives may 
confer a signaling benefit on a party by virtue of their presence.  The lawyer’s presence 
                                                                                                                                            
reproduced when people and groups come into contact with justiciable events or legal 
institutions. Such experiences can also create inequality, in the sense that differences 
between people or groups become disparities through contact with justiciable events or 
legal institutions. Finally, civil justice experiences can destroy or destabilize inequality, 
as disparities are reduced through contact with justiciable events or legal institutions. 
 
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 
339, 346 (2008) [hereinafter Sandefur, Race, Class, and Gender].  In legal scholarship, an expansive 
literature has assessed how social factors, including race, class, and gender, systematically influence law 
and justice.  The literature explores issues such as the role of race in sentencing decisions, the effect of 
gender on jury selection, and the relationship between poverty, economic inequality, and constitutional law.  
Margaret Etienne, Pain and Race: A New Understanding of Race-Based Sentencing Disparities, 3 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 496, 503 (2006) (explaining that “The fourth (and current) wave of research questions the 
existence and extent of race-based sentencing disparities in the post-guideline, or “determinate sentencing” 
era”).  See generally Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social Science, 12 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2005); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993) (examining “the Supreme Court's use of the rationality standard in 
areas that affect poor people, and argues that the political powerlessness of the poor requires some form of 
enhanced judicial protection.”); Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People from 
Equal Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023 (2012).  A goal of this article is to add to the 
literature by questioning how the combination of representation, a party’s power, and the balance of power 
between the parties influences the legal process and the outcomes of cases in civil legal settings. 
26 See BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 10. 
27 “In general, one sees evidence that lawyers, officials, and legal authorities, as well as perhaps legal 
procedures themselves, exhibit impaired comprehension of the disadvantaged and less powerful.  However, 
in the case of class inequality…we have no studies comparing different groups’ experiences handling 
similar problems or in similar hearing settings.”  Sandefur, Race, Class, and Gender, supra note 25, at 349 
(citations omitted). 
28 “Status expectations theory argues that the influence attempts of high-status individuals succeed, and 
those of lower-status people fail, due to socially shared cognitions and expectations that link social status to 
attributions about personal ability and worth.”  Karyl A. Kinsey & Loretta J. Stalans, Which Haves Comes 
Out Ahead and Why: Cultural Capital and Legal Mobilization in Frontline Law Enforcement, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 993, 996 (1999).   
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can signal to the court that the party is of some significance and that merits of the claim 
are worthy of consideration.29  This may be particularly true in courts with a large 
number of pro se litigants, where the presence of a lawyer is notable. 
Finally, our examination of expertise builds upon existing scholarship regarding 
effectiveness in civil legal settings, and in particular on recent work by Rebecca Sandefur, 
who explores a lawyer’s impact through a theory of professional expertise.  Sandefur 
draws on sociological theories of professionalism to articulate two categories of a 
lawyer’s professional expertise: substantive and relational expertise, or what might also 
be called “formal training” vs. “people knowledge.”30  
1. Substantive Expertise 
Substantive expertise is the abstract and principled knowledge held by 
professionals and gained through formal training. 31  In the legal context, this includes 
knowledge of the essential framework of professional theories, concepts, and rules as 
well as an understanding of how to operate within those rules.32  Thus, substantive 
expertise includes both law and procedure.33  Substantive legal knowledge consists of 
legal theories, common law rules, statutes, doctrine, case law, and other content-based 
                                                
29 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 42-43. 
30 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 7-8 (describing substantive and relational 
expertise); KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY supra note 9, at 15-16, 194-95 (describing formal training and 
insider knowledge, or people knowledge, and a third category called process knowledge).  Sandefur 
describes two aspects of legal expertise, substantive (Kritzer’s “formal training”) and relational (Kritzer’s 
“insider” or “people” knowledge).  Sandefur’s substantive expertise category includes formal knowledge of 
the law, as well as procedural rules.  In contrast, Kritzer places knowledge of procedural rules in a separate 
category called “process knowledge,” which also includes lawyers’ understanding of how a court or other 
legal institution operates and the processes involved in legal advocacy in that setting, such as the process of 
a given type of hearing in a given court. 
31 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 7-8.  See also Stephen R. Barley, Technicians in 
the Workplace: Ethnographic Evidence for Bringing Work Into Organizational Studies, 41 ADMIN. SCI. 
QUARTERLY 404, 425-429 (1996). 
32 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 8; HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: 
LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 7 (1990) [hereinafter THE JUSTICE BROKER].  
33 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 8. 
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knowledge.34  In their work, lawyers draw on this knowledge to determine what law is 
relevant to a given client’s case.  Procedural knowledge is what lawyers use to move 
cases through the formalities of the civil justice system, such as the appropriate means of 
communicating with the court and opposing parties, the use of pleadings and motions, the 
mechanisms of introducing evidence, and the navigation of litigation timelines.35    
Sandefur notes that an important use of substantive expertise is the translation of a 
client’s real-world problems into legally cognizable terms.36  For example, transforming a 
client’s experience of a car accident into an argument for liability and damages uses 
formal legal knowledge, while knowing where to file such a claim and how the 
applicable court processes work uses procedural knowledge.  Through substantive 
expertise, a lawyer will identify which harms might have a legal remedy, such as physical 
injury and property damage, and which do not, such as psychological effects.  
2.   Relational Expertise 
In contrast to the principled and rule-based nature of substantive expertise, 
relational expertise is “situated and contextual.”37  It involves understanding how to 
navigate the human relationships within which a professional’s work takes place, 
including how to behave and how to communicate with others.38  This includes what can 
be called “people knowledge” and is the expertise that guides interactions with judges, 
                                                
34 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 8; KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 32, 
at 7. 
35 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 8. 
36 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 8-9.   
37 Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 9 
38 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 9. 
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court staff, clients, and other attorneys.39  It also includes the fact of having professional 
relationships with these actors.    
A characteristic of relational expertise across professional contexts is that it is not 
typically part of the “explicit curriculum of professional training” despite the fact that it 
may be essential for a professional’s success in her work.40  Many professionals learn 
relational skills outside of formal training and through experience in their day-to-day 
working lives.  In addition, relational expertise operates on specific as well as general 
levels. There are ways of behaving and communicating that are fairly universal, but there 
are also ways of behaving and communicating that are context-dependent.  For example, 
when speaking in court, a lawyer will address a judge with “Your Honor” because this is 
a universal practice in the profession.  But that same lawyer, if she is new to the 
courtroom, will not have a sense of that particular judge’s communication style and 
preferences until she has spent some time interacting with and observing the judge.   
3. Non-lawyers’ Use of Professional Expertise  
Professional expertise is a powerful currency for a party to use in navigating the 
civil justice system.  Consequently, representation by a lawyer confers advantages for 
those who can obtain it.41  But in the absence of representation, some parties to legal 
disputes can use the functional equivalent of professional expertise and thus the benefits 
that flow from it.   
                                                
39 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 196. 
40 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 9. This is traditionally the case in legal education, 
which emphasizes instruction in legal doctrine and formalized legal argument, particularly in the core 
courses of the first year of law school.  Many law students graduate without any formal training to develop 
the knowledge and skills of relational expertise.  However, the growth of clinical and other forms of 
experiential legal education has incorporated the development of relational expertise into the law school 
curriculum for some students. 
41 See Sandefur, Impact of Counsel, supra note 8, at 70-71.  See notes 3-23 and accompanying text. 
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Some parties may, as a baseline matter, possess the functional equivalent of 
professional expertise by virtue of factors unrelated to their involvement in the civil 
justice system, but most gain this equivalent expertise over time by virtue of their 
involvement as repeat players.42  Mark Galanter famously articulated how powerful 
parties, whether individuals or organizations, benefit from being repeat players, and how 
comparatively less powerful parties, the prototypical one-shot litigants, are 
disadvantaged.43  Galanter highlights the systemic power of parties who are repeat 
players in a given area of law as compared to the relative powerlessness of one-shot 
litigants.44   
Repeat players have frequent dealings with the legal system, can develop the 
functional equivalent of substantive expertise by anticipating the issues they will face in a 
given case, and thus can plan in advance for the litigation.  These parties can also develop 
relational expertise by building relationships with court staff and judges, and thus 
develop both comfort and fluency in communicating with the people who work within a 
civil justice setting.  People and organizations that repeatedly navigate legal disputes in a 
given area of law have the potential to develop knowledge and skill that mirror a lawyer’s 
professional expertise.45  Due to a lack of formal training and routine practice, these 
litigants may not become fully expert, but they can develop a knowledge base and a set of 
                                                
42 See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About 
When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 79 (2010) (stating that “[r]epeat players are 
more likely to wield financial power, utilize a forum that serves their interests, benefit from the substantive 
law, and be familiar with the procedure”); Marc Galanter, supra note 5, at 96-107; Deborah Rhode, Access 
to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1806 (2001) (“Yet comparative research finds that nonlawyer 
specialists are at least as qualified as lawyers to provide assistance on routine matters where legal needs are 
greatest.”). 
43 See Galanter, supra note 5, at 96-107. 
44 See Galanter, supra note 5, at 96-107. 
45 See Galanter, supra note 5, at 98, 114-15. 
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skills and behaviors that give them significant strength in legal disputes, particularly 
those with which they are familiar.  
Even parties that are not repeat players can use some elements of a lawyer’s 
professional expertise, particularly relational expertise.  For example, non-lawyers who 
are familiar with general norms of professional communication may have the ability to 
relate effectively to actors in the civil justice system.  Other parties who are not repeat 
players may be able to obtain a basic level of substantive expertise through education by 
studying the law or reading a court’s procedural rules.  Finally, some individuals may 
seek the advice of an attorney but then choose to represent themselves, and thus they 
benefit from at least a measure of professional legal expertise.  It is worth noting that 
those individuals most likely to seek out this substantive expertise in the first place are 
those who have some level of power and resources.  
Of course, those parties that are the least likely to have some equivalent to 
professional expertise are those without the social, cultural, economic, or professional 
background to come to the legal process with this knowledge or to quickly adopt such 
knowledge during their interaction with a court.  And, therefore, these parties are both the 
ones at the greatest disadvantage in the legal process and the ones who have the most to 
gain from representation and the expertise it provides. 
III. Data 
This article is part of a broader study based on the broadest and deepest collection 
of data about representation in recent years.  The study is informed by our experience 
representing claimants in unemployment insurance appeal hearings before the D.C. 
Office of Administrative Hearings.  Though we did not conduct formal qualitative 
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observations of these hearings, two of the authors have supervised clinical law students in 
these cases over the course of four years and in more than a hundred cases combined.  
And this clinical practice has led to conversations with other representatives, judges, and 
court staff about various issues concerning representation in this context.  The questions 
raised by the authors’ experience in these cases were the impetus for this project, the 
relationships developed during these cases led to access to the data for this study, and the 
authors’ observations contribute to the hypotheses in this article.   
To identify a universe of cases for this article, we collected unemployment 
benefits appeals hearing data from the District of Columbia Office of Administrative 
Hearings for the year 2012.  This data set encompasses 1,794 unique cases over the study 
period.46  In order to ensure the greatest utility of the data, coded variables include:  
• a party’s representation (or lack thereof),  
• the type of representation (lawyers, third parties, clinical students, lay 
representatives),  
• the presence of representation at the hearing (as representatives do not 
necessarily attend the hearing),  
• the appearance of parties at the hearing,  
• the participation of parties in different procedural elements of the case, and 
• the length of time for procedural steps and cases to be resolved. 
 
As a key goal of the study is to understand the context of representation, we attempted to 
code every possible procedural element of each case, though only a subset of these 
procedures are addressed in this article.47  The coded variables include: 
                                                
46 The data discussed in this article are the result of a larger effort to collect data on all unemployment 
insurance appeals in the District of Columbia for 2011, 2012, and 2013.  We anticipate that this data set 
will be available for the future research proposed at the conclusion of this article and will include 
approximately 7000 unique cases, approximately 5500 of which concern the circumstances of separation 
from employment. 
47 Some procedures, such as disclosure of witnesses, are excluded from this article because of small sample 
sizes in our one year data set.  Other procedures, such as the use of motions, are not considered because we 
believe they are more complex and potentially implicate other areas of inquiry.  Thus we plan to address 
them in future articles. 
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• dates of the eligibility period,  
• date and substance of the underlying agency (claims) determination,  
• date of filing of the appeal,  
• date and number of document disclosures,  
• number of documents introduced,  
• number of documents admitted,  
• date and number of witnesses disclosed,  
• date and outcome of requests for subpoena,  
• date of any pretrial motions filed and their outcomes,48  
• date of any hearings held,  
• the appearance of parties at the hearing(s),  
• the appearance of representatives at the hearing(s), 
• any appearance and testimony by witnesses,  
• telephone appearances,  
• use of interpreter,  
• verbal motion for judgment at a hearing,  
• verbal voluntary dismissal at a hearing,  
• date of any post-hearing motions and their outcomes, 
• final procedural outcome, and  
• final substantive outcome. 
To collect the data, we engaged in a three-step process.  First, we downloaded 
data from the court’s case management system.  Second, we supplemented and verified 
this data through review of each paper case file, conducted according to a comprehensive 
collection protocol.  Third, we performed supplemental two-tier data checks of the paper 
case files and reviewed the collected data for both internal consistency and consistency 
with court procedures.  The collected data was then coded according to a comprehensive 
coding plan to allow for the use of statistical software for analysis.   
This article focuses on a subset of the data: all unemployment appeals where the 
circumstances of separation are at issue, regardless of which parties appeared at the 
hearing.  This is not a sample of available cases, but rather every such case in the District 
                                                
48 Pretrial motions include those to withdraw the appeal, withdraw as representative, expedite the final 
order, continue the hearing, for a new hearing or to reopen a case, for relief from a final order, for 
reconsideration, for subpoena, for telephone hearing, to compel, noting intent not to appear, for judgment, 
for extension of time, to file under seal, to add a party, to quash, for an interpreter, to consolidate cases, to 
appear pro hac vice, to supplement the record, and to remand, as well as responses to these motions. 
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of Columbia in 2012.  This data set captures the breadth of circumstances where 
representation may have a correlation to outcomes and is a larger and broader sample 
than earlier studies.49  It does not, however, include the subset of unemployment appeals 
regarding underlying questions of eligibility and benefit calculation, as these appeals 
involve a state agency rather than the employer as the opposing party.  
To understand the data, and thus our analysis of the context in which we 
investigate our hypotheses of balance of power and expertise, it is helpful to understand 
the details of the unemployment insurance appeals context in which our study operates. 
A. The Site of the Study 
The site of this study is the District of Columbia’s central administrative court, the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).  An independent agency created by the 
District government, OAH adjudicates cases involving a range of issues arising from the 
work of District agencies.50   The study focuses on a subset of OAH cases, 
unemployment insurance appeals regarding qualification.  In these cases, an individual 
seeking unemployment insurance benefits – a claimant – faces his or her previous 
employer in a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who will determine 
whether or not the claimant will receive unemployment insurance benefits. 
1. Unemployment Insurance Program  
Unemployment insurance is a social insurance program designed to provide short-
term cash payments to temporarily unemployed workers.  The program, established in the 
1930s in the wake of the Great Depression, was intended to limit the negative economic 
                                                
49 See supra, notes 7-23 and accompanying text. 
50 D.C. CODE § 2-1831.02 (2013). 
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effects of short-term unemployment.51  Unemployment insurance has been a particularly 
important part of the American social safety net in recent years in the context of record 
high unemployment rates triggered by the recession that begin in 2007.52  In the District, 
unemployment was as high as ten percent following the recession.53 
Unemployment insurance is funded by a combination of federal and state payroll 
taxes assessed to employers.54  Federal law sets out the framework of the program 
including basic requirements that states must meet in order to receive federal funding.55  
For example, federal law limits the amount of time any individual may receive 
unemployment insurance; however, during times of high unemployment, Congress may 
legislate extensions.56  Each state is responsible for administering its own unemployment 
insurance program and for paying benefits directly to unemployed individuals.57  Beyond 
the broad requirements set by federal law, states have flexibility in program design, 
including determining who may receive benefits, as well as the amount and duration of 
benefits.58   
                                                
51 COMM. ON ECON. SEC. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1935) (providing recommendations that were the 
basis of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), which was codified in various 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
52 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY at 1 (December 2008); “The national unemployment rate peaked at 10 percent in October of 
2009.”  BUREAU OF LABOR STATS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SPOTLIGHT ON STATISTICS, THE RECESSION OF 
2007-2009 (February 2012). “Unemployment benefits also reduce poverty significantly, especially when 
unemployment is high: they kept 2.5 million people (including 600,000 children) out of poverty in 
2012.  In 2009, when unemployment was higher and jobless benefits more generous, they kept 4.9 million 
people out of poverty (including 1.3 million children).”  CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CHART 
BOOK: THE WAR ON POVERTY AT 50 2 (January 7, 2014). 
53 BUREAU OF LABOR STATS, LOCAL AREA UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, available at 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST530000000000003 (last visited, March 13, 2014). 
54 26 U.S.C § 3302 (2014). 
55 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (2014). 
56 Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318, 106 Stat. 290 (1992). 
57 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (2014). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 503 (2014). 
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2. Unemployment Insurance Law in the District  
In the District of Columbia, the question of whether an unemployed person may 
receive benefits is determined by a two-part test: eligibility and qualification.59  
Eligibility includes the threshold requirement that a claimant has worked a sufficient 
amount of time and earned a minimum level of wages in the period leading up to the 
claim for unemployment insurance, known as the “base period.”60  If the base period 
requirement is satisfied, then a claimant must certify – both in the initial claim for 
benefits and on an ongoing basis for each week that she receives benefits – that she is 
available for work and is actively seeking work.61  If the base period, availability, and job 
search requirements are met, then a claimant is eligible and the next inquiry is whether 
she is qualified for unemployment insurance.62  
Qualification concerns the reason for the claimant’s separation from employment.  
As a general matter, the unemployment insurance program in most states is intended to 
pay only those who are unemployed “through no fault of their own.”63  Under District 
law, unemployed workers are presumed qualified for benefits, but may be disqualified 
from benefits for one of two reasons: because they were terminated for work-related 
misconduct or because they voluntarily quit without good cause.64   
                                                
59 The results presented in this paper include only cases where the legal issue is a claimant’s qualification 
for benefits.  We have made the analytical choice of separating the two data sets because the parties, the 
nature of representation, the hearing process, and the legal and factual issues involved in eligibility and 
qualification cases are substantively different and would make a combined analysis unworkable.  In future 
work, we hope to explore the particular dynamics of eligibility cases, which also raise issues of power and 
legal expertise, albeit in different ways.  
60 D.C. CODE § 51-107(c) (2013). 
61 D.C. CODE § 51-109 (2013). 
62 D.C. CODE § 51-109 (2013). 
63 See MAURICE EMSELLEM ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, FAILING 
THE UNEMPLOYED: A STATE BY STATE EXAMINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS 4-5 (2002). 
64 D.C. CODE § 51-110 (2013). 
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3. The Parties 
Our data set for this article includes unemployment appeals where the employer 
and the claimant are parties to the case.  At first glance, it may seem odd that employers 
are involved in unemployment insurance claims at all – why would a company spend 
time and resources fighting a benefit administered by the government?  Primarily, 
employers have a stake in these cases because the structure of the unemployment 
insurance program creates a financial incentive to contest unemployment claims.  The 
amount an employer is required to contribute to the program through payroll taxes is 
based in part on the number of former employees who have received unemployment 
insurance.65  Sophisticated and large employers typically try to limit costs related to 
unemployment claims by minimizing the number of former employees who can make a 
successful claim for benefits.66    
There is another less technical factor that may drive some employers to contest a 
worker’s claim for benefits – emotion.  The workplace can be complex and the 
grievances that plague some relationships between workers and supervisors can spill over 
into the context of an unemployment claim.  Our observations of many unemployment 
cases suggest that some employers may contest a claim for benefits without consideration 
of any financial imperative, but instead due to a judgment that the former employee does 
not “deserve” benefits.  
However, employers do not always oppose the grant of benefits for a former 
employee.67  An employer may have terminated the employee out of financial necessity 
                                                
65 D.C. CODE § 51-103 (2013). 
66 See Jason deParle, Contesting Jobless Claims Becomes a Boom Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2010, at Al. 
67 Employees sometimes believe that an “initial denial of benefits is the result of the employer's active 
opposition to the claimant's benefits when, often, a claims examiner will deny benefits based on a fact or 
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or for some other reason unrelated to the worker’s conduct; in these cases, the employer 
may affirmatively support the employee’s grant of benefits.  Still other employers may 
not be concerned about any financial consequences or may be otherwise uninterested in 
fighting the case. 
In this study, we did not collect identifying or demographic data on either party, 
in part for confidentiality reasons and in part because the data was not consistently 
available in the case files.  However, based on other research and our own observations, 
we can generally describe the characteristics of employers and claimants in 
unemployment appeals.  
The employers who appear before OAH in unemployment cases range from small 
businesses to major corporations to federal agencies.68  Our anecdotal experience 
suggests that certain high-turnover industries that tend to pay lower wages may be over-
represented among employers; for example, private security, food service, janitorial, and 
health care companies were often the opposing parties in the cases we tried before OAH.  
In addition, due to a feature of the unemployment tax system, many non-profit employers 
have a strong incentive to participate.69 
Claimants similarly include individuals from range of backgrounds and industries, 
from low-wage workers to lawyers who earned six-figure salaries.70  However, our 
                                                                                                                                            
set of facts obtained without any agenda or even involvement on the employer’s part.”  Colleen F. 
Shanahan, Cultivating Justice for the Working Poor: Clinical Representation of Unemployment Claimants, 
18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 401, 414 (2011). 
68 Based on authors’ personal observations between 2011 and 2014. 
69 Under federal law non-profit employers may opt out of paying unemployment taxes and instead 
reimburse states directly for the cost of payments made to former employees.  26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) 
(2014); 26 U.S.C.A. § 3309(a)(2) (2014). 
70 Based on authors’ personal observations between 2011 and 2014.  In the United States during 2013, the 
number of weekly claims was around 2,984,300, 56.2% of which were by males while 43.2% were by 
females. The industries with the highest unemployment submissions were the Administration and 
Support/Waste Management/Remediation Services at 12.9%, Construction at 11.9%, and Manufacturing at 
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observation and data from studies of unemployment claimants indicate that those who 
receive unemployment benefits are disproportionately poor or low-income and people of 
color.71  In addition, for a variety of reasons too numerous to list here, low-wage jobs 
tend to expose workers to the possibility of being terminated, or present reasons for 
quitting a job, far more commonly than higher-wage work.72  
4. The Representatives  
Although most litigants are unrepresented, with claimants much more likely to be 
unrepresented than employers, there is a significant amount of representation in OAH 
cases.73  On the employer side, there are lay representatives and attorneys.  On the 
claimant side, representatives are usually either attorneys or law students working in the 
context of a clinical education program, where an attorney supervises their work.   
Employer lay representatives are typically employees or contractors working for 
third-party employer representation firms.  OAH rules allow these lay representatives to 
appear on behalf of parties in unemployment appeals.74  Third-party firms are retained by 
employers, particularly by large companies, as a cost-reduction strategy and have varied 
levels of involvement in cases, depending on what the employer has retained them to 
                                                                                                                                            
9.8%. The races with the highest claims rates were whites at 54.6%, blacks at 17.3%, and Hispanics at 
16.2%. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, Characteristics of the Insured Unemployed (Mar. 29, 2004), available at 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/chariu.asp (last visited March 24, 2014). 
71 See Austin Nichols & Margaret Simms, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Receipt of Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits During the Great Recession, URBAN INSTITUTE BRIEF, 4 June 2012 (finding African-
Americans are less likely to receive unemployment benefits even after accounting for factors that affect 
benefit receipt for other workers); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-0701147, LOW-WAGE AND 
PART-TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES OF RECEIPT 3 (2007) (finding low-wage 
workers were half as likely to receive UI benefits despite being two and a half times more likely to be out 
of work, even where job tenure for both groups was similar).  
72 Christine Vestal, AN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BALANCING ACT, STATELINE, THE DAILY NEWS 
SERVICE OF THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/an-
unemployment-insurance-balancing-act-85899374819 (last accessed March 13, 2014) (finding low-wage 
and part time workers are less likely to quality for unemployment benefits as other workers). 
73 See infra, Figure 4. 
74 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1, § 2982.1 (2013). 
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do.75  A firm may manage an employer’s entire unemployment insurance cost-reduction 
program or only part of it.  Services include handling correspondence with DOES and 
OAH, collecting and submitting evidence, all the way up to full representation at a 
hearing.76  The actual representatives who appear may be paralegals, may have years of 
experience in unemployment appeals, or may have little experience at all.   
When an attorney appears on behalf of employers at OAH, the attorney may be a 
private lawyer, in-house counsel for the company (this is particularly common where the 
employer is a District or Federal government agency), or part of a program run by the 
Chamber of Commerce, which provides attorney representation to employers who qualify 
for services.77   
On the claimant side, the most common attorney representatives work for the 
District AFL-CIO’s Claimant Advocacy Program, which provides free legal 
representation to claimants.78  The Legal Aid Society also assists unemployment 
                                                
75 See deParle, supra note 66. 
76 See e.g., Help Control Unemployment Claims Cost, Maximize Human Capital, and Mitigate 
Risk, ADP (March 13, 2014), https://www.adp.com/solutions/large-business/services/tax-and-
compliance/unemployment-claims.aspx;  Unemployment Cost Management, EQUIFAX (March 13, 
2014), http://www.talx.com/Solutions/Compliance/UnemploymentTax/. 
77  The [District of Columbia] UI statute authorizes funding for two organizations to  
provide free legal services to parties in UI appeals, one for employees and one for 
employers. The Claimant Advocacy Program (CAP), sponsored by the Metropolitan 
Washington Council, AFL-CIO, assists employees who have been “denied 
unemployment compensation in D.C. or whose benefit awards have been appealed by the 
employer.” The employer counterpart to the CAP program is the Employer Assistance 
Program (EAP), which provides free legal assistance to employers in UI appeals. The 
Washington Area Chamber of Commerce sponsors the EAP program.  
 
Enrique S. Pumar & Faith Mullen, The Plural of Anecdote is Not Data: Teaching Law Students Basic 
Methodology to Improve Access to Justice in Unemployment Insurance Appeals, 16 UDC L. REV. 17, 23 
(2012). 
78 Id. at 24. 
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claimants on a limited basis, and a number of local law schools provide student attorney 
representatives in unemployment appeals.79 
5. Hearing Process and Procedure 
In the District, the Department of Employment Services (DOES) administers the 
unemployment insurance program.  An individual seeking unemployment benefits begins 
the process by filing a claim with DOES, which makes the initial determination.  After 
receiving notice of DOES’s determination, any party to the case, the claimant or the 
employer, may appeal the determination to OAH within fifteen days and receive a 
hearing before an ALJ.  Following the hearing, the ALJ will issue a final order that 
explains the factual and legal basis of their decision.  An ALJ’s decision may be appealed 
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, a court that has been active in interpreting 
the unemployment statute and regulations in recent years with an emphasis on construing 
District law to favor the grant of benefits to claimants.80   
OAH hears all unemployment insurance appeals in the District, along with a 
range of other cases such as public benefits, rent control, business and professional 
licenses, and building, health, and fire code violations.81  The individuals who serve as 
ALJs are lawyers appointed to the court by a special commission for full time seven year 
                                                
79 Id.  While we acknowledge it is an imperfect distinction, for the purposes of this article, we consider only 
licensed lawyers as attorneys, and all other representatives, including law students, as non-attorney or lay 
representatives.  A future article, using the larger three year data set, will investigate these distinctions more 
closely. 
80  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has emphasized the “humanitarian purpose of the 
[unemployment compensation] statute,” see e.g., Johnson v. So Others Might Eat, Inc., 53 A.3d 323, 326 
(D.C. 2012), and has repeatedly stated that the unemployment insurance program is a “remedial 
humanitarian [program] of vast import,” and that the statute and regulations implementing it must be 
“liberally and broadly construed,” see e.g., Bowman-Cook v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority, 16 A.3d 130, 134 (D.C. 2011).   
81 District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings, www.oah.dc.gov/page/about-oah (last visited 
February 4, 2014). 
Shanahan, Carpenter, & Mark, Representation in Context 
DRAFT - August 11, 2014 
 
 28 
terms.82  The ALJs conduct hearings in a recently renovated facility where courtrooms 
include audio and video technology, a bench, a witness stand, tables and chairs for 
litigants, and space for an audience.83  As a result of the renovations, OAH looks and 
feels similar to a traditional civil court setting; in fact, all ALJs began wearing robes 
following the renovations.84 
In unemployment insurance appeals, the parties to a qualification case are the 
claimant, who is seeking benefits, and the employer.  Either party may be the appellant in 
the case.  The hearings are de novo, which means the ALJ takes evidence in the case and 
makes factual determinations and conclusions of law without regard to DOES’s initial 
determination.85  An unemployment insurance hearing begins with the baseline legal 
presumption that a claimant is entitled to benefits, and it is up to the employer or DOES 
to prove otherwise.86  Thus, a lawyer can exercise substantive expertise in making sure 
the client attends the hearing.  Because the hearing is de novo and the employer has the 
burden of proof, if a claimant attends and the employer does not, the claimant 
automatically wins. 
The hearing process in unemployment cases generally follows a basic pattern.  
The ALJ makes a threshold determination regarding whether the court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case, a determination that may require testimony by the appellant.87  Jurisdiction 
is based on the timeline of the appeal; if a party files an appeal outside of the fifteen-day 
                                                
82 D.C. MUN. REGS. subt. 6-B § 3700 (2013). 
83 Authors’ personal observations between 2011 and 2014.  See also description of District of Columbia 
Office of Administrative Hearings renovation, http://dgs.dc.gov/page/office-administrative-hearings-build-
out (last visited March 13, 2014). 
84 Authors’ personal observations and conversations with Administrative Law Judges at the District of 
Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings. 
85 See Rodriguez v. Filene's Basement Inc., 905 A.2d 177, 179-80 (D.C. 2006). 
86 See D.C. CODE § 51-110 (2013). 
87 Based on authors’ personal observations between 2011 and 2014. 
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time window, the court may not have jurisdiction to hear the case and will dismiss the 
appeal.88    
Next, the ALJ will turn to the issue of separation from employment.  That is, why 
is the unemployed person no longer working for this employer?  At this point, the only 
information the ALJ has is the DOES determination, which is not, as a matter of law, 
substantive evidence in the case.89  However, as a practical matter, the document gives 
the ALJ some idea of the issues at play in the case.90  Although practices vary by judge, 
ALJs typically begin this portion of the hearing by explaining the underlying law, 
including the burdens of proof, and by informing each party of their role in the hearing.91  
Because the claimant is presumed qualified for benefits, hearings begin with the 
employer’s case-in-chief, during which the ALJ will hear from the employer and any 
employer witnesses, and will consider any documents or other evidence presented by the 
employer.  Next, the ALJ will take evidence from the claimant, who may also have 
witnesses or documents.  The ALJ may ask questions of either party and may also allow 
the employer to present a rebuttal case.   
Although this basic pattern is followed by most ALJs in most hearings, individual 
judges have different styles and preferences.92  As OAH has been part of a recent effort in 
                                                
88 See D.C. CODE § 51-111(e) (2013). 
89 See D.C. CODE § 51-110 (2013). 
90 Authors’ personal observations between 2011 and 2014.  Judges sometimes state on the record that they 
have read the claims determination and that it has given them some sense of the potential legal and factual 
issues in the case.  Most of the time, a judge will also note that the hearing is de novo and explain the 
functional meaning of that term to the parties.  
91 Id.  
92 See Shannon Portillo, The Adversarial Process of Administrative Claims: The Process of Unemployment 
Insurance Hearings (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (concluding, based on a sociological 
study of 45 unemployment insurance hearings at OAH, that  “the hearing runs like traditional courtroom 
litigation” but that when claimants represent themselves, “[ALJs] engage directly with the claimant, 
gathering as much information as possible.”  In contrast, when counsel is present “ALJs behave in 
traditionally passive ways, allowing each party to present their case.”). 
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the District of Columbia to improve access to justice for pro se parties, ALJs have 
focused on providing more consistent and clearer descriptions of concepts like burdens of 
proof and use of testimony in hearings with unrepresented parties.93  For example, some 
judges, when faced with an unrepresented employer, may ask the employer to give a 
narrative about why the claimant was separated from employment.  Other judges may ask 
a series of very direct questions and refuse to hear a longer narrative.  Still other judges 
use a balance of these two approaches.   
a. Burdens of Proof 
Burdens of proof are an important part of the legal and procedural landscape of an 
unemployment hearing, as in any litigation.  As a matter of procedure, the burden of 
proof determines which party must present evidence first.  As a matter of law, the party 
with the burden must provide the evidence necessary to prevail under the law.  Under 
District law, which party carries the burden varies between misconduct cases, where a 
claimant was terminated, and “quit” cases, where a claimant resigned.  
In a misconduct case, the employer bears the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant was terminated for a reason that 
amounts to misconduct under District law.  In such hearings, the ALJ will typically 
instruct the employer to present evidence first, followed by the claimant.  If the claimant 
resigned from the position, the employer bears to the burden of proving the claimant quit 
voluntarily.94  The burden then shifts to the claimant to prove that the resignation was for 
good cause as defined by District law.   
                                                
93 See infra, n. 105. 
94 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 7, § 311 (2013). 
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The burden of proof has a significant impact on the strategic choices that parties, 
including legal representatives, make in presenting unemployment cases.  Because the 
hearings are de novo, a threshold issue in any appeal hearing is whether it is a misconduct 
or quit case.  An obvious question is, if the ALJ cannot consider the claims determination 
as evidence, how does the ALJ determine who has the burden?  In practice, ALJs often 
begin the hearing by asking one or both of the parties to describe what is at issue in the 
case.  Some judges will only ask this question of the employer, while others will ask it of 
the claimant, or of both parties.   
As a matter of strategy, depending on the factual issues at play, it may be in a 
claimant’s interest to allow the employer to speak first, but in some cases, it may be in 
the claimant’s interest to attempt to define the issues from the beginning.  For example, 
the facts of a claimant’s separation from employment may blur the line between 
termination and resignation. To understand this concept, consider this example.   
Wilma worked as a security guard, earning minimum wage, for Security 
Guards Inc.  Wilma has a high school education and has never been 
involved in a legal proceeding.  SGI is a company with approximately 700 
employees.  Wilma is fired from her job after she gets a new supervisor 
who does not like her.  The supervisor and Wilma had several heated 
exchanges over the length of Wilma’s breaks, exchanges that were very 
upsetting for Wilma.  In addition, in a period of three weeks Wilma was 
late to her shift three times: by 4 minutes, 6 minutes, and 7 minutes.  
Wilma’s supervisor wrote her up each time and then fired her after the 
third incident for violating the company’s attendance policy.   
 
Wilma files for and is denied unemployment benefits by her state labor 
agency based on a finding that she was fired for misconduct.  Wilma files 
an appeal and attends her hearing by herself.  SGI sends Elaine, the 
director of Human Resources to the hearing.  Elaine handles 5-10 
unemployment benefits hearings for SGI each year.  
 
Now imagine if Wilma knew she was about to be fired, perhaps because she heard 
statements to that effect from other employees.  Rather than face the potential 
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embarrassment of being fired, Wilma chose to resign instead.  Unfortunately for Wilma, 
it may be very difficult to win an unemployment insurance appeal under District law on 
resignation.   
In basic terms, the law makes it quite easy for an employer to prove that a 
claimant quit voluntarily, and very difficult for a claimant to then prove that she quit with 
good cause.  The legal standard for quit cases sets a high bar for claimants to meet.  
However, if the ALJ believes the claimant was fired, and the employer has to prove 
misconduct, it may be a much easier case for a claimant to win, given the nature of the 
legal standard for misconduct, which places the burden of proof on the employer.  Thus, 
if Wilma has a sophisticated representative, she may assess the facts and law and 
determine that Wilma’s chances of winning will be greatly improved if the ALJ applies a 
misconduct analysis.  Despite the fact that the employer technically has the burden of 
proof, and even if the ALJ turns to the employer first, the representative may make the 
strategic choice to make a statement to the ALJ noting that Wilma was functionally 
terminated, with the hope that this small remark will plant the right seed in the ALJ’s 
mind.   
An alternate scenario, where Wilma is unrepresented, might result in Wilma 
saying at the beginning of the hearing that she quit because she wasn’t being treated well 
by the employer, they were always getting on her case about her breaks, and she had 
enough of it. Wilma may be operating out of a desire to protect her own personal pride—
she may not want to admit that she was about to be fired for something she did on the job.  
Unfortunately for Wilma, satisfying her personal instincts may defeat her legal case. 
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The burden of proof also presents critical choices about offering evidence.  In a 
misconduct case where the employer has the burden, it is often unwise for a claimant to 
offer much evidence at all, other than evidence that undercuts the employer’s case-in-
chief.  A claimant may unwittingly make a statement, introduce a document, or call a 
witness who provides facts that actually harm the claimant’s case, and help the 
employer’s argument for misconduct.  Just like a defendant in a criminal trial, the wisest 
strategy for a claimant is often to say as little as possible, and when speaking, to only 
address the issues presented by the other side.   
A nuanced understanding of the role of burdens in unemployment appeals can 
make the difference between a claimant winning or losing.  In our experience, it is the 
natural instinct of a claimant who was fired to want to tell the story of the events that led 
to the termination, including all the negative information about the employer that he can 
muster.  However, the employer is not on trial and the claimant has no burden of proof in 
a misconduct case.  Any evidence the claimant offers runs the risk of actually adding 
additional facts that support a finding of misconduct.  In this context, representatives can 
frame issues and present evidence in the light most favorable to their client.95  A 
representative might also decline to put a claimant on the stand to testify, based on an 
assessment that the employer’s evidence is too weak and the claimant’s potential 
testimony too damaging to risk opening the client up to cross-examination or questioning 
by the ALJ.  Similarly, a representative might make a motion at the close of the 
employer’s case, pursuant to a little-used OAH rule, asking that the claimant be granted 
benefits because the employer has not carried the burden of proof. 
                                                
95 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 39. 
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An understanding of burdens of proof can also affect preparation for a hearing.  
For example, a claimant’s lawyer may present her client’s testimony in a limited way so 
that the employer has to present evidence to uphold its burden, rather than relying on the 
claimant’s testimony.  Similarly, a representative may prepare the client for the hearing 
by explaining the particular court and judge, so that the client knows what to expect, feels 
more confident, and thus, is a better witness.96   
b. Evidence Disclosures 
Another critical aspect of hearing procedure, one that relates to burdens of proof, 
is an OAH procedural rule that governs the disclosure of evidence prior to a hearing.  The 
rule requires a party to send to the court and the opposing party, at least three days prior 
to the hearing, any documents and a list of any witnesses that the party plans to offer at 
the hearing.97  This “three-day rule” is designed to ensure that parties, and the court, have 
notice of evidence that will be presented at a hearing.   
Parties may choose to disclose, and ultimately introduce, a variety of 
documentary evidence.  For employers, this may include documents such as employee 
policies, documents reflecting discipline of the employee such as prior warnings, 
communications between the employee and supervisors about conduct or the 
circumstances of separation from employment, or documentary evidence of conduct such 
as video or written reports.  Claimants may have documentary evidence including 
communications with supervisors reflecting permission or acquiescence to conduct, 
documents reflecting contrary or supplementary policies, communications regarding the 
                                                
96 Id. at 38. 
97 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 1 § 2985 (2010). 
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circumstances of separation from employment, or evidence of mitigating circumstances 
such as health problems, family demands, or failure to be paid.  
The three-day rule presents a choice for claimants, employers, and their 
representatives; if there are documents or witnesses you may want to use at the hearing, 
do you disclose them?  For employers, the choice is fairly simple.  If you want to be sure 
the evidence gets in, you should probably disclose it.  For claimants, the picture is more 
nuanced.  The rule has an exception for evidence that will be used for impeachment or 
rebuttal, which leaves an opening for claimants to introduce evidence without disclosing 
it.98  Thus, a representative may decide not to disclose documents in advance in a 
misconduct case, relying on an attempt to use the documents as rebuttal or impeachment 
at the hearing.  In contrast, in a resignation case, a claimant may be more likely to 
disclose documents.  A claimant or representative without appropriate expertise might 
disclose documents to the claimant’s disadvantage based on an assumption that 
disclosure is required or on a misunderstanding of the burdens of proof in the case. 
Similarly, a representative can contribute her expertise by gathering evidence and 
preparing evidentiary arguments based on her understanding of what evidence will be 
useful and whether documents or testimony are more powerful.99  This is particularly 
important for employers, who are required to bring witnesses with personal knowledge 
and documentation of the incidents to meet their burden of proof.  Experienced or 
represented employers may begin gathering evidence from the day an employee starts 
work (for example, having the employee acknowledge receipt of company policies) and 
will be able to easily access these records for an unemployment hearing.  In contrast, 
                                                
98 Id. 
99 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 39-41. 
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unrepresented claimants are unlikely to appreciate or operationalize the need for 
documents or other evidence for the strategic power of disclosing (or not disclosing) 
evidence.  This documentation is particularly important for claimants to try to exclude or 
at least discredit the weight of hearsay evidence. In general, understanding, preparing, 
and asking good questions on direct and cross examinations of witnesses is also an 
element of expertise in presenting evidence.  So in Wilma’s case, a lawyer may make the 
choice to introduce the competing employer policies, discussed above, or to object to 
Elaine’s testimony on hearsay grounds because Elaine’s office location means she did not 
witness any of Wilma’s conduct. 
Although unemployment hearings are not procedurally complex compared to 
protracted civil litigation, the cases do present significant layers of legal and procedural 
choices for any party or representative.  The ability of a litigant to navigate these legal 
and procedural steps can make the difference between winning and losing.  Similarly, the 
range of representatives’ expertise may lead to a range of procedural behaviors. 
B. Representation and Outcomes Across Studies 
There is interesting variation among the previous studies of unemployment 
insurance appeals and this project.  In the present study, in all cases with any level of 
participation by the parties, the claimant won in 67% of the cases.  The overall claimant 
win rate in this study is higher than in previous studies.100  In addition to differences in 
samples, this variation may be explained by the fact that unemployment regulations in 
many states, including the District of Columbia, have evolved in the decades since the 
Kritzer, Emsellem and Halas, and Rubin studies.  Specifically, states have enacted 
                                                
100 See supra, n. 8-24 and accompanying text. 
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statutory or regulatory exceptions in favor of claimants, including exceptions granting 
benefits for claimants who are victims of domestic violence,101 relocate with spouses,102 
or are caretakers for sick family members.103  In addition, the tribunal for this study, the 
District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings, is unusual in that it is a highly 
professionalized administrative court that hears a variety of administrative appeals.104  As 
such, it has been the subject of a variety of efforts aimed at protecting the rights of pro se 
litigants, including a revision of the D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct, effective January 1, 
2012.  Based on the 2007 American Bar Association model code of judicial conduct, 
these changes emphasized the affirmative duty of judges to facilitate the use of the courts 
by pro se litigants.105  Thus, one would expect the nature of judicial conduct at the site of 
the present study would result in higher win rates for claimants who benefit from this 
assistance.  Each of these factors is likely to contribute to the greater win rates for 
                                                
101 In addition to the District of Columbia, there are 35 states that have extended unemployment benefits to 
cover victims of domestic violence. THE WOMEN’S LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, STATE LAW 




102 An exemption for claimants who voluntarily leave his or her employment for the purpose of relocating 
with his or her spouse exists in some states, including D.C., but it is unavailable in others. See, e.g. Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii) (West 2009), Va. Code Ann. § 60.2-618 (West 2013); see also 27 
A.L.R. 6th 123 (2007). 
103 Most states, including D.C., provide exceptions for caregivers of family members with an illness, others 
provide very limited exceptions in some cases and others do not provide an exemption for this 
circumstance. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-236 (West 2009), Fla. Stat. § 16. 443.101(1)(a)(2013). 
104 This is in contrast to unemployment insurance appeal hearings in other jurisdictions that have been the 
subject of other studies. See Greiner and Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation, supra note 1, at 55-57; 
KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY supra note 9, at 27. 
105 See Zoe Tillman, D.C. Courts System Adopts New Code of Judicial Conduct, THE BLOG OF LEGAL 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/01/dc-courts-system-adopts-new-code-of-
judicial-conduct.html (explaining additional changes made to the D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct for pro se 
litigants beyond what is provided by the ABA Model Rules, including that judges may change the order in 
which they collect evidence, explain or avoid legalese, and suggest additional resources that may help a pro 
se litigant.). See generally D.C. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.6 (2012).  In addition to the District of Columbia, 
24 states have adopted provisions similar to the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct to help a 
litigant’s ability to be fairly heard. Margaret J. Vergeront and Jeff Brown, Access to Justice Commission 
Update, THE THIRD BRANCH (Dec. 11, 2013) http://wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/fall13.pdf. 
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claimants as compared to earlier studies.  However, as noted above, this study is less 
concerned with overall win rates and more concerned with the relative advantages 
provided by representation, as measured by case outcomes. 
IV. Hypotheses and Methodology 
A. Hypotheses 
This article analyzes the data using two sets of questions: how the balance of 
power between the parties and representation interact and what role a representative’s 
expertise plays in the process. 
1. Representation and Balance of Power  
The first area of analysis proposes that the central question of whether 
representation matters necessarily requires looking at both the balance of representation 
and the balance of power of the parties.  The first hypothesis is based on the prediction 
that representation provides the represented party with an advantage106 and that this 
advantage is greater when the parties have imbalanced representation, where one party 
has representation and the other does not.  Layered underneath this balance of 
representation is the balance of power between the parties themselves, which we 
hypothesize offsets the representation advantage.  As a general matter, in this hypothesis 
and the ones that follow, we are using the employer as a proxy for the more powerful 
party in civil legal processes generally and the claimant as a proxy for the less powerful 
party in the civil legal process.107  This first hypothesis also includes the view that when 
                                                
106 See note 7 and accompanying text. 
107 We acknowledge that employers and claimants, like all parties, are a variety of individuals and 
institutions.  However, we believe that the general characteristics of claimants and employers in 
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the parties are both represented, the claimant gains a greater advantage from 
representation than the employer because the claimant has less power to begin with.  
Thus, we hypothesize that represented parties have higher win rates than unrepresented 
parties, and that when representation is imbalanced in favor of one party, the party has 
an even higher win rate. 
a. Appearance of Representative 
As it is possible for a party to have a representative of record who does not 
actually appear at the hearing,108 this hypothesis also examines the relationship of the 
appearance of a representative to case outcomes.  This additional layer of representation – 
a representative who actually appears at the most important moment of representation – is 
something that has not yet been studied and is a critical element of a conversation about 
representation.109  In unemployment appeals in particular, the hearing is the focal point of 
activity because it is a de novo evaluation of the case and because court procedures 
provide for limited activity outside the hearing.  There is limited motion practice, and 
particularly very limited substantive briefing.  If a party or her representative does not 
                                                                                                                                            
unemployment insurance appeals make the use of these parties as proxies for “haves” and “have nots” a fair 
one. See, infra, note 124.   
108 See supra, n. 76.  There are a variety of situations where a representative of record may not appear at a 
hearing.  It may be that a party has a retained representative who is the contact for service of process.  Thus, 
there is a representative of record but that representative might not actually be asked to be involved in the 
handling of a case.  It may also be that a party retains a representative to help a human resources employee 
prepare for the hearing, but does not want to spend the money to pay the representative to attend the 
hearing.  It may also be that a party indicates to the court that she has a representative, but in fact does not 
or ceases retaining that representative before the hearing.  It is the authors’ anecdotal impression that these 
situations are more likely to occur for employers, where the lay representative industry involves large 
companies that provide claims management as well as actual representation.  These distinctions in 
representative type are a topic for future research. 
109 This analysis also avoids concerns about randomizing representation and selection bias, as the entire 
sample in this section of the analysis is parties with representation.  For a discussion of selection bias 
challenges in research on the effects of representation, see Greiner & Pattanyak, supra note 1, at 2193-95. 
Shanahan, Carpenter, & Mark, Representation in Context 
DRAFT - August 11, 2014 
 
 40 
appear at a hearing, and especially if it is the party with the burden of proof, that party is 
unlikely to win the case. 
In this regard, we hypothesize that a representative who shows up at a hearing 
increases the advantages of having a representative of record.  A party with a 
representative who appears should correlate with better case outcomes, and an imbalance 
in representatives at the hearing should correlate with proportionally better case outcomes 
for the party with the representative who is present.  Thus our first hypothesis includes 
the corollary that represented parties whose representative appears at the hearing have 
higher win rates than those whose representative does not appear at the hearing.  
2. Representation and Strategic Expertise  
Questions of the operation of representation and the interaction of power and 
expertise can be better understood by looking in more detail at the choices parties make 
in the litigation process.  As described in more detail below, the procedures from our data 
examined for this article are (1) whether the party appears at the hearing, (2) whether the 
party presents testimony, (3) whether the party discloses documents before the hearing as 
required by court procedures, (4) whether the party introduces documents at the hearing, 
and (5) whether the party has documents admitted at the hearing.110  We focus on these 
procedures as they are the most commonly used steps for a party to present evidence in a 
case, as compared to procedures that are less commonly used and result in changes in the 
procedural path of a case.  Our analysis of these five procedures allows us to gain an 
                                                
110 We use the terms “appearance” and “evidentiary steps” to capture the five variables measured in this 
article, and the term “procedures” to describe the more general concept.  There is admittedly some variation 
in the nature of the procedural steps considered in this hypothesis.  One variable – disclosure of documents 
– occurs before the hearing, while the other variables occur at the hearing.  Some variables – disclosure and 
introduction of documents and bringing witnesses to a hearing – measure the party’s choice to engage 
while the final variable – admission of a document – measure the success of the use of that procedure.  
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initial understanding of representation in context based on a large number of cases and 
using procedures that have a substantive relationship to the outcome of a case. 
Our second hypothesis is that parties appear and use evidentiary steps more when 
represented, and that this use of procedures is correlated with better case outcomes.  The 
first part of this hypothesis is based on the understanding that a representative’s 
substantive expertise will result in greater knowledge, and thus use, of procedures.  The 
second part of this hypothesis is based on the analysis that a representative’s expertise 
will lead to engaging in steps that are more likely to be successful for the party.  We 
hypothesize that this use of procedures encompasses more than simply knowledge of the 
procedures because a representative may lend additional contextual or strategic expertise 
to the use of procedures.  This more strategic use of procedures may include an employer, 
who bears the burden, making greater use of steps that allow the party to present evidence 
and similarly may include a claimant, who does not bear the burden, using such steps less 
often.  In either case, we hypothesize that the strategic use of procedures that comes with 
representation leads to better case outcomes.  Thus our second hypothesis is that 
represented parties, including those whose representative appears at the hearing will 
appear at the hearing themselves and use evidentiary steps more than parties whose 
representative does not appear.  Further, we hypothesize that those parties with 
representatives who use these evidentiary steps have higher win rates than those 
represented parties who do not use the same steps. 
B. Methodology 
In this article, we use a combination of cross tabulations and difference in 
proportions tests to demonstrate patterns of relationships between the variables of interest 
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present in the data.  Cross-tabulation allows us to demonstrate basic patterns of 
correlation in the data, and difference in proportions tests allow us to further investigate 
the relationships of interest through statistical testing of the comparison of groups.  
Cross-tabulation is a descriptive statistical tool that summarizes data into contingency 
tables by grouping the frequency of interrelation between variables.111  Difference in 
proportions tests allow us to determine if certain outcomes of interest (e.g., winning or 
losing an appeal) can be attributed to a statistically significant difference between groups 
based on the presence or absence of an additional characteristic of interest (e.g., having 
representation or not).112  In this initial examination of the data, we seek to identify 
meaningful patterns in the data that may be further tested by more complex empirical 
methodology in future work.  
We recognize the criticisms lodged against observational studies about the impact 
of representation.113  Though our access to data and the ethical challenges of randomizing 
representation mean this study is not based on a randomized design, it is based on all 
unemployment cases, rather than a sample, in the relevant time period.114  We note that 
we do not call what we do “causal” and instead use statistical methods to compare groups 
and demonstrate the correlative relationships between representation and case and 
procedural outcomes.  While we recognize the limitations of our analysis, we believe our 
observations are still meaningful.  Even though it is not operating from a random sample, 
our approach of using a complete set of cases to look at differences between groups 
                                                
111 Philip Pollock III, THE ESSENTIALS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 59-61 (4th Ed. 2012). 
112 Alan Acock, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA 142 (2nd Ed. 2014). 
113 See notes 3-23 and accompanying text. 
114 An example of the logistical and ethical challenges of randomizing the contextual questions we raise is: 
even if one could randomize ethically the fact of representation for a party, it is hard to imagine how to 
randomize ethically whether a particular party presented testimony or introduced a document, in order to 
measure the corresponding case outcomes. 
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provides important insights into the questions of representation, balance of power, and 
strategic expertise that frame future work to test the theories we develop in this article.   
1. Dependent Variables: Case and Procedural Outcomes 
Our first dependent variable, and the classic dependent variable in studies of 
representation, is case outcomes – whether a party wins or loses the case.  At the outset, it 
is important to note that the overall rate at which parties win is less meaningful in a study 
such as this one that looks at comparative case outcomes based on independent variables 
such as representation.  Because our theories concern the relative advantages of 
representation, the more important analysis is case outcomes for the same party in light of 
different independent variables.   
While our hypotheses necessarily require looking at case outcomes, they also 
require engaging in another level of dependent variables: procedural outcomes.  For this 
paper, we identified five dependent variables that are different procedural steps in the 
unemployment appeals process, and their corresponding outcomes. The steps examined 
in this data as dependent variables are (1) whether the party appears at the hearing, (2) 
whether the party presents testimony115, (3) whether the party discloses documents before 
the hearing as provided by court procedures, (4) whether the party introduces documents 
at the hearing, and (5) whether the party has documents admitted at the hearing.  For each 
procedural step, we examine two distinct questions: (1) whether having a representative 
results in greater use of the procedure and (2) for those parties with representatives (or 
those without), whether using each procedural step correlates with improved case 
                                                
115 This variable is defined broadly – whether there is any testimony for a party’s case – to encompass both 
parties who themselves testify (i.e. did Elaine or Wilma testify) and witnesses whose testimony is elicited 
by parties (i.e. did Elaine bring another company employee to testify).  We use this broad definition 
because our interest is in the choice by the party or representative to present testimony.  
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outcomes.116  Examining these dependent variables provides additional nuance to the 
interaction of representation, strategic expertise, and power. 
In the entire sample, regardless of representation, claimants and employers used 
procedures at the rates shown in the table below. 
  
And for the entire sample, regardless of representation, use of each procedural 
step results in the case outcomes in the table below.  
                                                
116 For all of these dependent variables, our analysis includes all of the cases in our sample, regardless of 
whether or which party appeared at the hearing and thus whether a full hearing was held.  We include all of 
these cases because we cannot know why one party or its representative appears at a hearing.  For example, 
this may be due to an imperfect appeal, ignorance, inadvertence, or a party or representative’s strategic 
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Figure 1: Use of Procedures 
Claimant Employer 
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2. Independent Variables: Representation and Balance of Representation 
Our hypothesis that representation provides the represented party with an 
advantage, and that this advantage is greater when the parties have imbalanced 
representation, begins with the independent variable of the fact of representation.  A 
closely related independent variable is the balance of representation between the parties – 
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Figure 2: Win Rates with Use of Procedures 
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Figure 3: Representation Balance 
 
In our data, employers had some kind of representation more than twice as often 
as claimants, with claimants having representation in 22.2% and employers in 49.4% of 
the cases.  As for the balance of representation, the parties both have representation in 
12.7% of cases and neither has representation in 41.0% of cases.  It is rare for a claimant 
to have representation when an employer does not, only occurring in 9.5% of the cases.  
In contrast, an employer has representation when a claimant does not in 36.8% of the 
cases. 
3. Independent Variable: Representative Appearance at Hearing 
As it is possible for a party to have a representative of record who does not 
actually appear at the hearing, another independent variable is whether a representative 
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actually appears at a hearing. 117  In our data, 51% of employers with representatives and 
65% of claimants with representatives have that representative appear at the hearing. 
V. Findings 
This section summarizes our findings in light of our hypotheses.  In the following 
section, we discuss the implications of these findings and areas for future research. 
A. Representation and Balance of Power  
Despite variation in parties’ overall win rates and rates of representation, 
represented claimants have a significantly higher win rate than claimants who are not 
represented.118  In contrast, represented employers do not have a significantly different 
win rate as compared to unrepresented employers.   Further, either a claimant or 
employer with unbalanced representation in their favor has higher win rates for that party 
than for those parties without the representation advantage.  A claimant also has a higher 
win rate when both parties are represented, as compared to claimants when both parties 
are unrepresented.  Finally, the appearance of a representative has a similar relationship 
to win rates for both employers and claimants when compared to parties when the 
representative does not appear. 
                                                
117 See supra, n. 108 for a discussion of situations where a representative of record may not appear at a 
hearing. 
118 As this article uses difference in proportion tests to demonstrate patterns of relationships between the 
examined variables, we report our findings as comparisons, e.g. “represented claimants have a higher win 
rate than unrepresented claimants.”  For ease of expression, we do not reiterate each time we describe a 
finding that this describes two distinct groups: the group of claimants in the data who were represented and 
the group of claimants in the data who were not represented, rather than the experience of a single claimant 
exposed to the presence and absence of the variable of representation. 
In addition, we use the word “significant” to report statistically significant findings, as reflected in 
Appendix A.  All of the differences described in this article are statistically significant unless explicitly 
described otherwise. 
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In examining the relationship between representation, power, and case outcomes, 
it is helpful to have an understanding of the nature of case experiences for each party.  
Representation is more common for employers, with employers represented in 49.4% of 
cases and claimants represented in 22.2% of cases.  As shown in Figure 4, claimants’ win 
rates are significantly different when represented, while unrepresented employers do not 
see a significant difference in win rates compared to represented employers. 
An additional layer of analysis is whether a party with representation imbalanced in its 
favor sees higher win rates than a party in a case with balanced representation.  Figure 4 
also shows how both a claimant and an employer with a representation advantage see a 
significantly higher win rate, compared to a claimant and an employer without that 
advantage. In addition, as shown in Figure 5, the data demonstrate that claimants have 
higher win rates when both parties have representation, as opposed to when both parties 
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 Employers and claimants have different correlations between a representative 
who appears at a hearing and win rates.  When an employer has representation of record, 
the employer wins a significantly greater number of cases, winning 23.9% of the time 
when the representative does not show up as compared to 46% when the representative 
does appear.  When a claimant is represented and their representative appears, there is no 
significant difference in the proportion of cases the claimant wins as compared to 
represented claimants whose representative does not appear.  This result is not 
particularly surprising, as there is a high correlation between a claimant having 
representation and the representative showing up at the hearing.  In very few instances 
does a claimant retain representation and the representative does not appear.  Thus, it is 
difficult to determine the additional benefit of representative appearance, given both the 
high win rate in the represented group, as well as the high rate of appearance by that 
representation. 
Claimant Win Rate 
79.3% 
Claimant Win Rate 
61.0% 
Employer Win Rate 
20.7% 













?Both Parties Represented ?Neither Party Represented 
p=.00 
Figure 5: Win Rates and Balance of Representation 
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Imbalance in the appearance of a representative has a similar relationship to win 
rates as overall imbalance in representation. Claimants for whom a representative appears 
for a party win a significantly greater amount of the time when no representative appears 
for the other party, as compared to when representation appearance is balanced.  When 
representation is unbalanced in favor of the employer, the employer wins a significantly 
greater amount of the time, compared to when representative appearance is balanced. 
 
B. Representation and Strategic Expertise 
The second area of inquiry takes a broader look at the interplay of power and 
expertise.  The data reveal that for claimants and employers who are represented, and for 
those whose representatives appear at a hearing, the party’s appearance and the use of 
evidentiary steps is higher than for unrepresented parties, and for those parties whose 
representatives do not appear at the hearing.  But, the relationship between this use of 
























Figure 6: Win Rates across Appearance Balance 
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employers’ use of these steps correlated with higher win rates, but represented claimants’ 
use of these steps correlated with lower win rates. 
1. Party Appearance at Hearing 
Both parties have higher rates of appearance when they have a representative, and 
both see advantages in outcomes from their appearances.  
As Figure 7 shows, when a claimant has a representative, the claimant appears at 
the hearing at a significantly higher rate, compared to when the claimant does not have a 
representative.  If a claimant’s representative appears at the hearing, claimants also attend 
the hearing at a higher rate, compared to the group in which the claimant’s representative 
does not appear.  
 
 An employer appears at the hearing at a significantly higher rate when represented, 
and an employer whose representative appears at the hearing has a significantly higher 
rate of appearance at the hearing, compared to employers whose representative does not 




















Representation Representative Appears 
p=.00 
Figure 7: Claimant Appearance Rates by Levels of Representation 
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When a claimant has a representative and the claimant appears at the hearing, the 
win rate for those claimants is nearly statistically significantly higher than for those in the 
group of represented claimants that do not appear at their hearing, as shown in Figure 
9.119  Similarly, among represented claimants, when both the claimant and representative 
appear at a hearing, the claimant has a higher win rate compared to when only the 
representative appears.  
                                                
119 Note that represented claimants who appear at their hearing do not necessarily appear with a 
representative.  See supra n. 108 for an explanation of why a party may have a representative of record, but 



















Representation Representative Appears 
p= .00 
Figure 8: Employer Appearance Rates by Levels of Representation 
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As Figure 10 shows, when represented, employers win at a greater rate when they 
appear at a hearing, compared to represented employers who do not appear at a hearing.  
Similarly, when the employer’s representative appears, employers who appear with their 

















Claimant Appears Claimant and Rep Appear 
p=.105 and p=.01 




















Employer Appears Employer and Rep Appear 
p=.00 
Figure 10: Represented Employer Win Rates Across Employer Appearance 
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When parties have a representative, they present testimony at different rates 
compared to those who do not have a representative whether that testimony is by the 
party or another witness.   
Figure 11 demonstrates that when a claimant does not have a representative, the 
claimant presents testimony a significantly lesser amount of the time than when the 
claimant has a representative.  Among represented claimants, claimants whose 
representative does not appear present testimony at a significantly lesser rater than when 
the representative does appear. 
 
A represented employer presents testimony more often than an unrepresented 
employer, as shown in Figure 12.  Similarly, among represented employers, the 
frequency of testimony is higher for the group where representation appears as compared 




















Representation Representative Appears 
p=.00 
Figure 11: Claimant Testimony by Levels of Representation 
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Figure 13 shows that when an unrepresented claimant presents testimony of any 
kind, there is not a statistically significant difference in the claimant’s win rate compared 
to when an unrepresented claimant presents no testimony.  And when a represented 
claimant presents testimony of any kind, the win rate is 77.5% compared to represented 
claimants who present no testimony, who have a win rate of 89.6%.  The same is true for 




















Representation Representative Appears 
p=.00 
Figure 12: Employer Testimony by Levels of Representation 
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These results can also be observed when testimony is parsed into testimony by the 
claimant herself and testimony by another witness.  When an unrepresented claimant 
herself testifies, there is not a statistically significant difference in the claimant’s 
likelihood of winning the case.  However, when a represented claimant testifies, the 
claimant wins 77.8% of the time compared to 94% of the time if she does not testify.  
Similarly, when a claimant is represented and has any other witness testify, a claimant’s 
win rate in this group is 77.8% compared to 91.6% when a witness does not testify.  This 
relationship is also present when the claimant’s representative appears at the hearing; 
claimants who do not testify have significantly higher win rates than claimants who do 
testify, winning 95% of cases compared to 77% when the claimant testifies. 
The analysis of an employer’s representation and presentation of testimony 
demonstrates a different situation, as demonstrated in Figure 14.  When an employer is 























Unrepresented: Testimony Represented: Testimony Rep Appear: Testimony 
**not statistically significant for unrepresented, p=.001 for represented, p=.00 for 
representative appear 
Figure 13: Represented Claimant Win Rates Across Testimony 
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than those in the group that do not present testimony.  If an employer is represented, 
those who present testimony have a higher win rate than those in the group that did not 
present testimony.  And when comparing groups of employers that presented testimony 
when the representative appeared as opposed to when the employer did not present 
testimony, there is a similar pattern.120  
 
3. Document Disclosure 
Both represented claimants and represented employers disclose and introduce 
documents at a higher rate than unrepresented claimants and unrepresented employers.  
As shown in Figure 15, a significantly greater number of represented claimants disclose 
                                                
120  It is not useful to parse employer testimony into testimony by the party as compared to testimony by 
witnesses because the distinction between the employer “party” and employer “witness” is a fluid one that 
is not accurately captured in case records.  For example, the individuals at a hearing for an employer could 
be a human resources executive and the employee who supervised the claimant.  Depending on these 
individuals’ preferences, one or both of these individuals could testify and either one of them could act as 
the “party” during the hearing, speaking on behalf of the employer and presenting argument.  In contrast, 
























Unrepresented: Testimony Represented: Testimony Rep Appear: Testimony 
p=.00 
Figure 14: Represented Employer Win Rates Across Employer Testimony  
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documents compared to unrepresented claimants.  The same is true of employers, to a 
greater extent. 
 
 When a claimant is represented, or when a representative appears at a hearing, 
there is no statistically significant difference in the claimant’s case outcomes based on 
document disclosure.  Represented employers and those whose representative appears 
have significantly higher win rates when disclosing documents, compared to not 
disclosing, as shown in Figure 16.  Unrepresented employers also have significantly 
higher win rates when they disclose documents as compared to those unrepresented 






















Figure 15: Document Disclosure by Levels of Representation 
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4. Introduction of Documents 
The introduction of documents follows a similar pattern, with claimants in the 
represented group introducing documents at a significantly higher rate than unrepresented 
claimants, as shown in Figure 17.  Employers in the represented group also introduce 
























Unrepresented Represented Rep Appears 
p=.09, p=.00, p=.00 
Figure 16: Represented Employer Win Rates Across Document 
Disclosure 
Shanahan, Carpenter, & Mark, Representation in Context 




The introduction of documents has a different relationship to case win rates for 
employers and claimants, as shown in Figures 18 and 19.  For unrepresented claimants, 
represented and claimants whose representative appears, the introduction of documents is 















































Unrepresented Represented Rep Appears 
p=.08, p=.01, p=.01 
Figure 18: Represented Claimant Win Rates Across Document 
Introduction 
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On the other hand, for employers, the introduction of documents is associated 
with a higher win rate (as compared to the win rates of the groups not introducing 
documents), for unrepresented and represented employers, but this difference in 
proportions is not statistically significant in the representative appearance comparison.  
 
5. Document Admission 
Finally, documents that are ultimately admitted into evidence follow a similar 
pattern, with the group of represented claimants having documents introduced 97% of the 
time, as compared to 94% of the time for unrepresented claimants, a difference that is not 
significant between these groups. Employers that are represented have documents 
admitted almost 100% of the time, as compared to the group that is not represented, 
which has its documents admitted 98% of the time.  
As a result of these high rates of document admission, it is difficult to make 
























Unrepresented Represented Rep Appears 
p=.00, p=.00, p=.26 
Figure 19: Represented Employer Win Rates Across Document 
Introduction 
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employers.  While claimants in groups that do not have their documents admitted have 
significantly lower win rates as compared to those who do have their documents admitted, 
the likelihood that a claimant would not have their documents admitted is very low across 
both groups that are represented and groups in which representation appears.  There is no 
statistically significant difference in win rate across claimants that are unrepresented and 
have documents admitted or not admitted.  For employers, there are insufficient 
observations to compare across document admission categories for those who are 
represented and those whose representation appears. 
6. Procedures in Combination 
Finally, we combined appearance and the use of the four evidentiary steps 
described above into a single model to examine whether a party’s use of any of these 
steps is advantageous, and whether it is more or less advantageous for parties in 
represented groups.  Here, we use a binary indicator – claimants and employers are 
separated into groups based on if they have used any of the five variables or not.   
As shown in Figure 20, the win rate for unrepresented claimants that do not 
appear or use an evidentiary step is not significantly different from the win rate for 
unrepresented claimants that do use these procedural steps.  When these five steps are 
combined for represented claimants, claimants see slightly, but still not significant, lower 
win rates when using an evidentiary step as compared to represented claimants who do 
not use a step.  
However, the win rate for unrepresented employers that appear or use evidentiary 
steps is significantly higher than the win rate for those unrepresented employers who do 
not use any of these steps, as demonstrated by Figure 21.  And the same is true for 
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represented employers who see proportionally higher win rates when appearing or using 
an evidentiary step, compared to represented employers who do not use any of these steps.  
 
 
Use a Step 
63.3% 
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**difference in proportions is not statistically significant for either comparison 
Figure 20: Claimant Win Rates Across Combined Procedures 
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Figure 21: Employer Win Rates Across Combined Procedures 
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Our empirical results are consistent with previous studies and theories of balance 
of power and expertise, but also highlight the need for expanded theory and research of 
representation in context.  We begin that effort in this section. 
Our results reflect the practical reality of the civil justice system in America, one 
in which the vast majority of low-income Americans represent themselves – often against 
much more powerful parties – in the “ordinary, everyday cases” that constitute the bulk 
of the civil justice landscape.121  The results similarly support the theory that the civil 
justice system can reflect and reproduce existing social inequality, just as it can be a site 
where inequality is challenged.122  Where less powerful litigants represent themselves 
against those with more power, baseline inequities are likely to persist.  But where such 
litigants have legal representation, the opportunity to challenge inequality follows.   
A. Representation and Balance of Power  
Our empirical examination of representation in context provides additional 
understanding of the power dynamics between the parties, and the role of representation 
in those dynamics.  The data support previous studies that have found representation 
                                                
121 See KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 32, at 3. Kritzer offers a comprehensive analysis of 
lawyers’ role in the routine litigation that takes place in America’s state and federal civil courts.  For a 
vivid description of the day-to-day operations of an American civil court, see Kat Aaron, The People’s 
Court, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (November 21, 2013). See R. LaFountain, R. Shauffler, S. Strickland & 
K. Holt, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court Caseloads, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS (2012), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-
pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx (last visited March 24, 2014) 
(finding in a study of seventeen state general jurisdiction courts in 2010, 61% of cases were contract 
matters, 11% probate, 11% small claims, 6% tort, 2% real property, 2% mental health, and 7% all other 
civil; this excludes domestic relations cases, which make up 6% of state cases nationwide).  One study 
found that 62% of all plaintiff award winners in state courts were awarded $50,000 or less.  Lynn Langton, 
M.A. and Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 
2008) available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ascii/cbjtsc05.txt (last visited March 26, 2014). 
122 See Sandefur, Race, Class, and Gender, supra note 25, at 346-52 (discussing how race, class, and gender 
inequalities influence, reproduce, and are challenged by civil justice experiences). 
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correlates with improved case outcomes for claimants.123  More importantly, the data 
demonstrate that the relationship between representation and case outcomes is more 
pronounced when the balance of power is introduced into the analysis.  Though 
employers do not see a statistically significant difference in case outcomes when they are 
represented, they do see higher win rates when they have a representation advantage, as 
compared to employers that do not have a representation advantage.  And while claimants 
have higher win rates when represented as compared to unrepresented claimants, the 
proportion of cases claimants win is also higher when claimants have representation 
imbalanced in their favor, as compared to when representation is balanced.   
In the modern American legal system, where civil legal representation is not 
guaranteed by the state, a more powerful party, such as an employer, is more likely to 
have the resources to obtain representation, whether it is through an in-house legal 
department for a large employer or through a third party lay representative retained to 
control costs for a smaller employer.  In this scenario, our data show that the less 
powerful party, such as a claimant, is at a significant disadvantage.  In addition, the lower 
marginal advantage of representation for employers is consistent with the theory that 
employers come to the process with greater power – that can often approximate expertise 
– and thus have less to gain from representation than claimants.  Similarly, claimants 
come to the process with less power and thus have more to gain from representation, 
whether it is the fact of their own representation, representation when the employer has 
none, or when both parties are represented. 
                                                
123 Despite the difference from previous studies in overall claimant success rates, this study’s findings that 
represented claimants, as compared to unrepresented claimants, have a higher proportional win rate than 
represented employers, as compared to represented employers, is consistent with those studies.  See, 
KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 34; Rubin, supra note 9, at 628. 
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Notably, when both parties are represented, claimants see a higher proportion of 
favorable outcomes as compared to when both parties are unrepresented.   This last 
observation highlights the role of party power in any question of representation.  A 
claimant is at a disadvantage when there are no representatives as compared to when both 
parties have representation.  This finding supports the idea that more powerful parties, 
whether through functional expertise or repeat player advantage or simply greater 
resources, necessarily have an advantage in the civil legal process.  The presence of 
representation on both sides mitigates this advantage.  Where there is no representation, 
the parties do not have balanced power, but when there is representation for both parties, 
the parties’ power is more balanced.  Of course, one limitation of our study is that we do 
not know why some parties have representation and some do not.  There are many 
reasons why an employer or a claimant may seek or retain counsel, and these reasons are 
likely to interact with our findings regarding balance of power.  We hope that future work 
explores the interaction of these issues. 
These findings support a broader theory – one we hope future research will test: 
the lower a party’s power relative to its opponent, the more it stands to benefit from 
representation.  We argue this is due to the ability of better-resourced parties to use 
functional equivalents of professional expertise, an ability that is based on a party’s 
resources, social status, education level, and other elements of social and economic 
power. Thus, as a baseline matter, while some parties have advantages that would 
otherwise be conferred by representation, others have no such advantage.  We propose 
that this latter group will benefit the most from legal representation, particularly when 
they face a more powerful opponent.   
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Returning to our example, when Wilma faces SGI in her unemployment benefits 
appeal, there is an obvious disparity in power between the parties. Wilma has never been 
in the court before; indeed, she has never been in any court.  She earned minimum wage 
working for SGI and has had no income for a month while awaiting a decision on her 
appeal.  Elaine has been in the court many times before.  She has a basic understanding of 
what she must prove to ensure the judge denies the worker’s claim for benefits. She 
knows the type of evidence the judge wants to see.  Although she is not a lawyer, she 
understands the setting and the process well.  
In this setting, Elaine would certainly benefit from legal representation.  For 
example, a lawyer would understand that the testimony of a witness is better than 
assertions contained in a hearsay document.  But we argue Elaine will do a fairly good 
job on her own because she has done it so many times before and learned some things 
along the way.124  In comparison, the relative benefit of legal representation for Wilma is 
much greater.  She has everything to gain from a lawyer’s expertise.  In addition, the fact 
of representation may provide Wilma with some psychological comfort and increase in 
power as the party who has never been to court before.  A corollary issue is the symbolic 
effect of a powerful party.  Thus, in our example, SGI’s reputation in the community as a 
significant employer and Elaine’s reputation in the court as a regular presence may be 
another imbalance in power that works against Wilma.   
                                                
124 We recognize that there is variation in employers and claimants.  For example, if Wilma had been a 
cashier at a store with two employees and the owner, who appears at the hearing, has never been to court 
before, the role of representation may be different.  If the owner, like Wilma, knows nothing about the 
substantive law, procedures, or formalities of communication in the courtroom, he would also benefit 
significantly from legal representation.  For example, a lawyer might introduce a crucial piece of evidence 
that the owner would never think to bring.  However, for purposes of this project we are relying on the 
assumption that employers, in general, are more sophisticated and appear in court more frequently than 
claimants.  It is our hope that future research will test our findings and theories through a more detailed 
examination of parties’ sources of power. 
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The data support the intuitive result that a representative who appears at a hearing 
– as opposed to simply being the representative of record – is correlated with a higher 
proportion of favorable case outcomes for both parties and that this is also true where 
representation is imbalanced in that party’s favor.  And as with representation generally, 
the represented claimant sees a significantly higher win rate when a representative 
appears, while represented employers do not see a significant difference.  This is 
consistent with theories of power and expertise.  A representative who appears is more 
likely to affirmatively act on behalf of a party than a representative who is only of record.  
Though, it is important to note that the data show that representation without appearance 
still confers some advantage.  We argue that this is because representatives can still 
provide expertise without appearing at a hearing – by helping the party select which 
evidence is important to disclose or introduce, by shaping case theory or testimony, by 
explaining substantive or procedural law, or through other means An area for future 
exploration is clarifying the mechanisms of expertise outside of the hearing, and 
investigating how this expertise affects a party’s case outcomes. 
A final issue raised by this analysis is whether and how the type of representation 
affects the represented party’s advantage.  For example, in this sample employers have 
non-lawyer representatives in 38% of all cases while claimants have non-lawyer 
representatives, mostly student attorneys, in 2% of all cases.  Other studies have shown 
that non-lawyer representatives are less effective than lawyer representatives.125  This 
suggests a number of questions for future research.  Do non-lawyer representatives help 
parties less than lawyers?  Does this analysis change relative to the power of the 
                                                
125 KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 9, at 76-77. 
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represented party or the balance of representation in the case?  Could the high proportion 
of non-lawyer representation explain this article’s finding that employers gain less 
advantage from representation than claimants?  What is it that lawyers do for a party, as 
compared to what non-lawyers do, that makes them more helpful?  What is the nature of 
non-lawyer expertise vs. lawyer expertise?  These questions naturally tie to questions of 
strategic expertise.  If, as we theorize, lawyers contribute strategic expertise in a way that 
lay representatives cannot, then the data should bear this out.  Employers with attorneys 
who show up should win more than employers with lay representatives, and this should 
be especially true when these representatives appear at the hearing.  These questions of 
representative type are especially important for our civil legal system.  We continue to 
struggle with achievable ways to provide civil litigants with effective access to legal 
systems, and we continue to debate solutions ranging from guaranteed attorney 
representation to limited legal advice to self-help resources.  Yet we are trying to create 
change without understanding which of these types of representation is effective in which 
contexts.  Thus, understanding representation type in context is a crucial part of this 
conversation and a future article will focus on these questions.    
In addition to questions of representative type, our findings present a variety of 
avenues for future research, some of which we hope to address using our larger three year 
data set.  One set of questions concerns how the characteristics of a case interact with the 
balance of power and representation.  For example, in unemployment cases, the burden of 
proof varies depending on the theory of the case, and so we hope to explore how this 
variable interacts with the balance of power and representation.  Similarly, it may be that 
which party appeals is a significant variable in this analysis.  In addition, is there a way to 
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measure the factual strength of a case to explore the interaction of that variable with 
balance of power and representation?   
Another set of questions concerns how parties come to have representation.  
Qualitative research into the selection criteria representatives use to take clients may help 
us understand selection in context, as might qualitative research into how employers and 
claimants come to seek out or obtain representation.  Further, developing controlled or 
randomized study designs that take these factors into account will enhance our 
understanding of this important component of representation in context.   
A final set of questions concerns the sources of parties’ power, and how they 
affect the balance of power between the parties.  One identified source of power is 
substantive law, in this study the burden of proof is an example of this source of power 
for a claimant and her representative.  An area for future research is theorizing a typology 
of sources of power and how these sources of power are different in different legal 
contexts.  Another source of power is procedural rules, and this source of power may 
shift depending on how representatives and parties use it.  For example, a representative 
who makes frequent use of a procedure that has not been previously used may shift the 
balance of power in that legal setting.  Thus another area for future research is the 
existence of these sources of power, and how use of them by representatives shifts the 
balance of power between the parties.  We hope that these questions can inform the rich, 
ongoing effort to empirically examine representation, and can deepen this inquiry to help 
us understand representation in context.126  
                                                
126 See, e.g., Jiménez, Dalié and Greiner, D. James and Lupica, Lois R. and Sandefur, Rebecca L., 
Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research 
and Clinical Approach, 20 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL ON POVERTY LAW & POLICY 449 (2013).  
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B. Representation, Use of Procedures, and Strategic Expertise 
The parties’ use of procedural steps provides additional insight into the strategic 
choices of each party and the role representation plays in these choices.  Our findings 
confirm our hypothesis that expertise correlates with use of procedural steps, but also 
present the surprising result that this use of procedures by representatives does not 
necessarily correlate with better case outcomes.   
One overarching observation is that employers are more likely to take advantage 
of appearing at the hearing and evidentiary steps.  This can be explained in two different 
ways.  First, the employer has the initial burden in quit cases and the entire burden in 
misconduct cases and, as a result, must show up and use testimony or documents to make 
its case.  Thus, it is unsurprising that employers are more likely to appear and take 
advantage of the mechanisms for introducing evidence.  Second, employers, whether 
represented or not, are more likely to be sophisticated or repeat player actors and thus 
more likely to be aware of and take advantage of procedural mechanisms. 
Another overarching theme in the data is that represented parties on both sides 
appear, introduce testimony, and disclose, introduce, and admit documents at higher rates, 
as compared to unrepresented parties.  At a surface level, this is a logical result because if 
representatives have more procedural expertise, then a represented party would be 
expected to engage in these steps more than an unrepresented party.  In addition, the 
frequency with which employers use procedures – whether represented or not – 
underscores the theory of how parties’ inherent power interacts with the expertise 
contributed by a representative.  In this data, the employer uses most of the studied 
procedures most of the time – and the rate is slightly higher when the party is represented.  
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This is consistent with the theory that employers come to these cases with sophistication 
and repeat player experience that places them in an advantageous position, regardless of 
representation.  Thus, as borne out by the data on representation and case outcomes, an 
employer wins marginally more cases when represented, as compared to employers who 
are not.  A represented employer that discloses, introduces, or admits documents has 
more favorable case outcomes compared to employers that do not use these procedural 
steps.  Similarly, when a represented employer presents testimony, the employer’s 
favorable case outcomes are higher as compared to represented employers that do not 
present testimony.  When appearance and evidentiary steps are combined, unrepresented 
employers who use any of these steps have higher win rates than unrepresented 
employers who do not use any of these procedural steps, and the same is true – to an even 
greater extent – for represented employers.  
However, the analysis of the relationship between use of procedures and the 
party’s case outcome reveals a more complicated picture.  Our analysis of balance of 
power argues that claimants have more to gain from representation because they begin in 
a position of less power and sophistication.  The data showing significant differences in 
use of procedures when a claimant is represented as compared to when she is not 
represented is consistent with this theory.  However, our results also reveal the surprising 
result that when a represented claimant uses some of these steps, the claimant’s win rate 
is lower than when the represented claimant does not those same procedures.   
The data show that a represented claimant who presents testimony or discloses, 
introduces, or admits documents is associated with a lower proportion of favorable case 
outcomes as compared to represented claimants who do not use these same steps.  
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Represented claimants who disclose documents have the same case outcomes as 
represented claimants who do not disclose.  But represented claimants who introduce or 
admit documents win fewer cases than unrepresented claimants who do not use these 
steps.  The same is true when the claimant presents testimony, and is exaggerated when 
the claimant testifies.  The only exception to this pattern of worse case outcomes with 
increased procedural participation is when the claimant appears at the hearing.  When all 
of the procedures are analyzed together, neither represented claimants nor unrepresented 
claimants see significant differences in case outcomes with the use of any procedure as 
compared to not using any procedure.  This result – contrary to our hypothesis – suggests 
that claimant representatives’ use of procedures is in some way not effective and raises 
important questions about the value of representation and the type of representation 
necessary to have a positive effect on a party’s outcome. 
There are a number of potential explanations for this surprising finding, and we 
argue that our new theory of lawyers’ strategic expertise illuminates a number of these 
explanations.  One explanation for this finding is that the substantive legal context of our 
study – where the burden of proof is placed entirely on the employer in misconduct cases 
and initially on the employer in voluntary quit cases – creates disincentives for a claimant 
to use procedural steps to introduce evidence.  In these cases, a claimant wins when an 
employer introduces no evidence.  Thus, any use of procedures to introduce evidence by 
a represented claimant holds the inherent risk of weakening the presumption in the 
claimant’s favor.  Claimant representatives may choose to introduce documents in “closer” 
cases or cases where the representative perceives the case as unlikely to win and thus is 
simply using every procedure.  Alternatively, it may be that represented claimants are 
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more likely to use procedures to introduce evidence where the employer has already 
presented a strong case, and the representative perceives the need to introduce more 
evidence to counter the perceived or real lower likelihood of winning the case.  Relatedly, 
when a representative uses a procedure to introduce evidence, there is a risk that the 
lawyer goes too far and introduces more evidence than is necessary to advance the 
claimant’s case theory, ultimately weakening the claimant’s case.   
Another explanation may be the judge’s perception of procedural activity by a 
claimant representative.  It may be that, because employers have the burden of proof – 
and especially when employers or their representatives are repeat players before a 
particular judge – a judge perceives a represented employer’s use of procedures to 
introduce evidence as a signal that the employer has a strong case.  But the judge may 
similarly perceive a represented claimant’s use of procedures as a sign of a weak case, 
interpreting introducing evidence when the burdens of proof do not require it as a 
desperate measure.  A more cynical explanation may be that a judge may not be used to 
claimants having representatives, and the shift in procedural dynamics that results from a 
lawyer in the courtroom creates a negative perception by the judge of the claimant’s case. 
This pattern of better outcomes for represented employers who use procedures, 
and worse outcomes for represented claimants who use procedures, and the potential 
explanations for this pattern, suggest that there is more to understand about how power 
and expertise function in civil justice settings.  Each of these explanations underscores 
that representatives choose to use procedural steps to introduce evidence in context, and 
that for a representative to be effective, she must understand and adapt to this context.  
We argue that our findings and the potential explanations for them suggest that the 
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advantage provided by representation only occurs when the representative acts 
strategically.  Thus, a representative who reflexively uses procedures – such as having a 
claimant testify when the claimant does not have the burden – may hurt the party.  In 
contrast, a representative who strategically uses procedures – such as keeping a claimant 
from testifying so that the claimant does not help the employer meet its burden – is more 
likely to help the party.  This is especially true for the party without the burden – usually 
the claimant – as a representative for an employer that has the burden is more likely to 
improve outcomes by using any procedure.  Similarly, a representative for a claimant 
who uses a procedure based on unsound strategic judgment is more likely to worsen 
outcomes because the presentation of evidence may carry the employer’s burden and thus 
worsen the claimant’s case.   
Thus we propose a third theoretical component of representative’s expertise: 
strategic expertise.  This third component of strategic expertise complements existing 
theories of substantive and relational expertise.127  Specifically, strategic expertise is the 
ability to synthesize the rule-based and principled knowledge that characterizes 
substantive expertise with the understanding of people and human interaction that 
characterizes relational expertise and the ability to exercise judgment in applying this 
synthesis to a particular client’s circumstance. This concept of strategic expertise explains 
what lawyers do to connect formal training with situational understanding and 
supplement it with strategic thinking and judgment as they serve their clients. Where 
substantive expertise is abstract, rule-based, and learned primarily through formal 
training, and relational expertise is grounded in relationships and learned through 
                                                
127 See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. 
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experience, strategic expertise involves the knowledge, judgment, and skill lawyers 
employ when making decisions based on a synthesis of inputs gleaned from substantive 
and relational expertise.128  Strategic expertise involves combining knowledge of the 
underlying legal framework with the particularities of a given civil legal setting, 
including individual personalities and preferences, and exercising judgment to apply this 
knowledge to a particular client’s circumstance.    
Revisiting Wilma’s case illustrates how lawyers employ strategic expertise.  
Imagine Wilma and Elaine have lawyers for the hearing, and during the hearing Elaine is 
testifying about Wilma’s tenure as an employee of SGI.  Elaine is asked a question about 
Wilma’s habit of lending money to fellow employees – a topic that is not relevant under 
the rules of evidence. In the moment that she hears the question, Wilma’s lawyer has a 
decision to make: does she make a relevance objection?  Her substantive expertise in the 
law of evidence tells her that the statement may be inadmissible and that most judges 
would sustain an objection.  She knows the case well enough to anticipate the answer, 
one that she believes is not damaging for her case if it comes in (again, drawing on her 
substantive expertise regarding what she must prove to win the case).  Turning to her 
relational expertise, she knows that this judge has little patience for objections as a 
general matter, and she has already objected on a number of issues that concern her more 
                                                
128 Others have attempted to define legal strategy and strategic decision-making in a variety of ways.  See, 
e.g., David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods of American Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 
66 (2011) (differentiating strategic awareness from both substantive law and “judgment, analysis, synthesis 
and problem-solving” as an essential focus for legal education); Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical, 
Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment: Introducing Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm into the 
Clinical Setting, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 15, 42 (2004) (observing that “strategic intelligence” is essential in 
exploring scenarios and choosing effective courses of action and differs from personal, narrative, logical-
mathematics, categorizing and linguistic intelligences, which together contribute to a lawyer’s “critical 
judgment”); Richard K. Neumann, On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 345 (1990) (defining legal 
strategy as a composition of legal tactics based upon fundamental principles such as “concentration of 
effort on a hypothesized decisive event, planning from that event backward in time to the present, 
generating the largest number of reasonable strategic options from which to choose”).  
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than this particular question.  She also believes that if she objects, the judge may read it 
as a sign of weakness in her client’s case.  The attorney also knows that Wilma is 
confident in her advocacy and will not be concerned if she does not object to this 
question.  In the mere seconds that she has to make this decision, she weighs all of the 
inputs from her substantive and relational knowledge and skill and considers how they 
interact to impact her chance for overall success in the case.  She decides there is a 
greater risk to objecting than there is to letting the answer in.  Thus, although an objection 
would be a legally and procedurally accurate choice, one that would likely have been 
sustained by the judge, her understanding of the human dynamics in the room, combined 
with the substantive legal issues in her case, and her strategic understanding of the choice 
presented led her to not object.129 
Strategic expertise is the hallmark of quality legal representation and is 
inextricably linked with good judgment and zealous representation.  It is the expertise 
that lawyers draw on when making bold choices or taking calculated risks in their work.  
It comes into play when a lawyer pushes the boundaries of the law to make a novel legal 
argument; when a lawyer presents the facts of her client’s case in a way that reflects not 
only the merits of the case but also her impressions of the jury; when a lawyer chooses to 
make a lengthy closing argument before a visibly impatient judge, based on the 
calculation that the legal and factual issues are too complex to forego thorough treatment; 
                                                
129 Kritzer’s concept of process knowledge, described supra note 30, includes a lawyer’s understanding of 
how a given legal setting typically operates, for example, knowledge about the hearing process for a 
particular type of case, including the process in a particular court.  Our concept of strategic expertise 
includes the understanding of the operation of a given legal setting that is captured in Kritzer’s process 
knowledge, but strategic expertise expands process knowledge to capture a lawyer’s contextualized 
decision-making, which takes into account her knowledge of “typical process” as well as what this 
knowledge means for the specific case, client, and issue she is handling, and ultimately, how the synthesis 
of this information will inform her choices. 
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or when a lawyer chooses to disclose information to an opposing party because she 
believes it will lead to a favorable settlement, even when the disclosure is not required by 
formal legal procedures.  Unlike substantive or perhaps even relational expertise, only a 
representative can provide a party with strategic expertise.  While a judge may be able to 
explain a legal concept or procedure to a pro se party, and an unbundled service provider 
may be able to tell a claimant to speak slowly before a certain judge, only a 
representative who is in a hearing with a party and knows the party’s case can lend 
strategic expertise at a given moment. 
The idea that lawyers employ strategic expertise makes explicit what is implicit in 
the existing literature on lawyers’ professional expertise: that there is a constant 
interaction and tension between the substantive and the relational in legal work and that 
this interaction produces different actions in different contexts.  To effectively solve 
problems and make decisions for her client, a lawyer will use her training and experience 
in substantive law and procedure to determine what legal principles and rules apply in a 
given case.  She will also consider what she knows about the people she will interact with 
in the context of that case and the relationship dynamics she must navigate.  Then she 
will consider how the two sets of information interact with one another given the context 
of the particular case and exercise judgment in choosing her actions on behalf of her 
client.  This process characterizes the exercise of strategic expertise.  
This theory of strategic expertise is consistent with the sociological theory that a 
lawyer’s effect is primarily about helping a party navigate procedures and forcing a court 
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to follow its own rules.130  However, our view is that a lawyer using strategic expertise 
may push a court to enforce its own rules if that is the strategically advantageous choice 
in a particular factual and legal context.  But it is just as likely that a lawyer makes the 
choice to not encourage the enforcement of a rule because that is the strategically sound 
choice for that client in that context. 
Strategic expertise, like relational expertise, is not necessarily taught in any 
formal context.131  It is perhaps sometimes innate or developed from non-professional 
experiences, but it is typically gained and developed through professional experience.  It 
is situated and highly contextual, but it includes a deep appreciation for legal and 
procedural complexity.  It also includes an appreciation of risk and the ability to weigh 
costs and benefits of choices.  It necessarily involves judgment.  Sometimes, strategic 
choices require an attorney to ignore social and cultural cues in favor of a principled legal 
position.  Sometimes, strategy requires a lawyer to ignore legally incorrect moves by 
judges or opposing counsel in favor of preserving relationships.  It is the expertise that 
guides a lawyer in choosing her battles wisely.  In many ways, it is the essence of 
effective problem-solving; it combines an appreciation of legal frameworks, an 
understanding of the human context in which law operates, and effective contextual 
judgment, and it is thus an essential component of a lawyer’s professional expertise. 
Future research can provide more insight into our theory of strategic expertise.  
We hope to use future studies of this data set to explore this theory in several ways.  First, 
analysis regarding the type of case may provide more insight into the use of procedures 
                                                
130 See Sandefur, Elements of Expertise, supra note 24, at 4; Sandefur, Impact of Counsel, supra note 8, at 
74 (describing empirical evidence suggesting that “part of what lawyers do to affect litigation outcomes 
may be assisting people in managing procedural complexity”). 
131 Though, like relational expertise, clinical legal education and other experiential curricular approaches 
are opportunities for law students to develop strategic expertise.   
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and strategic expertise.  It may be that claimants’ use of procedures to introduce evidence 
in a quit case – where the claimant bears part of the burden of proof – have a different 
relationship to case outcomes than in a misconduct case – where the employer bears the 
entire burden.  And if there is not variation in the use of procedures and case outcomes, 
that may provide important insight into whether representatives for claimants are in fact 
contributing strategic expertise that translates to effective representation.  An additional 
layer of analysis could also include which party files the appeal, as this may help 
understand the party’s interest in the case or motivation to use procedures.   
Analysis of procedures other than those used to introduce evidence may reveal 
additional insights into representation and expertise.  Is there a difference between those 
procedures that happen in a hearing and those that happen outside the hearing, such as 
motion practice?  Does expertise function differently with regard to procedures that do 
not implicate the burdens of proof, such as a motion to continue as compared to a motion 
to dismiss on the merits?  Does analysis of how expertise actually functions pose critical 
questions about theories of client-centeredness and how a lawyer should enable her 
client’s voice and narrative in the legal process? 
In addition, analysis of the variation in actors may reveal different insights.  Does 
expertise function differently for different representative types?  Are there differences in 
how expertise functions for individual representatives within a given category of 
representatives?  Does it function differently for representatives who are repeat players as 
compared to those who are not?  Do different individual judges or their backgrounds 
result in different case outcomes relative to use of procedures?  Some of these questions 
may be answered by additional analysis of this data set, and some may be understood 
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better through qualitative research such as case observation or interviews with 
representatives and judges.    
Thus, the data analyzed in this article leaves us with two conclusions.  The first is 
that the balance of power and representation between the parties is as important to 
consider as the fact of whether a single party has representation.  Without examining the 
balance of power, we cannot truly understand the effectiveness of representation.  The 
second is that the expertise a representative lends to a party’s experience is nuanced and 
complex.  While a representative is likely to increase a party’s engagement in the legal 
process, the fact of having a representative, by itself, does not necessarily lend the 
expertise necessary to improve a party’s case outcome.  And increased engagement in 
process, by itself, does not necessarily improve outcomes.  Our theory of strategic 
expertise and our results demonstrate that beyond the fact of having a representative, it is 
what that representative does that really matters for a party.  And we need additional 
research – in this study and others – to understand these components of representation in 
context. 
VII. Conclusion 
We cannot understand civil justice outcomes, party experiences, or the role of 
representation without an appreciation of context.  This article begins a conversation 
about the context in which representation operates.  The questions we raise regarding the 
balance of power and the role of expertise can be explored across a range of civil justice 
settings, from other administrative courts, to immigration proceedings, to municipal and 
state district courts.  These issues can and should be explored in other areas of substantive 
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law, particularly those affecting the vast majority of litigants in American courts, such as 
housing, family, and consumer law. 
The questions of imbalance of power and representation explored in this article 
highlight that we should investigate other factors that might be at play in the civil justice 
system.  For example, are there party characteristics that might further refine our 
understanding of balance of power?  Similarly, does the type of representation play a role 
in the balance of power between parties?  In addition, does the type of case make a 
difference in the balance of power?  For example, does a case with less balanced burdens 
of proof – like a misconduct case in our data – counteract the balance of power or 
representation between the parties?  Or does a case with the government as the opposing 
party present a different balance than when the employer is the opposing party?   
The role of representative expertise, which leads to increased engagement in the 
legal process but which can, paradoxically, lead to worse case outcomes when exercised 
inappropriately, also suggests areas for future inquiry.  Does the use of procedure and its 
success vary by the type of representative?  Is a lawyer more successful than a non-
lawyer at using procedures, thus suggesting that lawyers do contribute unique, or at least 
less common, strategic expertise?  Are there characteristics of parties that can predict the 
functional expertise the party wields without representation?  Does the type of case 
change the expertise dynamic?  Is it more or less important to have a lawyer’s expertise 
when you are a party with the burden or a party without the burden?  Similarly, does this 
expertise operate differently in cases where the party on the other side is the government 
as opposed to an employer?  Are a representative’s actions outside the hearing important 
to the analysis of expertise?  Are there procedures representatives use more and with 
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more success – such as pretrial motions, requests for continuances, or requests for phone 
hearings – that have different relationships to case outcomes than procedures in the 
hearing?  Finally, what is the influence of a representative’s case selection on this 
analysis? 
An additional area of inquiry is how the presence of representation in a particular 
court or type of case might itself impact the dynamics of power balance and expertise.  
Put another way: when representatives are repeat players in a legal context, does that 
presence create systemic change that alters or reduces the need for representation?  Are 
there types of cases – in our data and generally – where representation has been 
consistently present, and are there measurable changes in behavior or outcomes in those 
cases even when representation is now no longer present? 
Finally, what is the role of judges in analyses of representation in context?  What 
role does the judge play in exacerbating or mitigating the balance of power and 
representation between the parties in the hearing?  If one party is unrepresented, does the 
judge – intentionally or unintentionally – change her behavior to level the playing field?  
How does strategic expertise – and particularly the absence of it – affect a judge’s 
perception of a party and that party’s case outcomes?  Does the presence or absence of a 
representative exercising strategic expertise interact with the judge’s procedural or 
substantive choices in the hearing?  Are judges appropriate and effective actors in 
mitigating an imbalance of power or lack of expertise?   
All of these questions for future exploration underscore the central concept of this 
project: to understand when, how and why representation matters, we must engage in the 
complexity of the legal process and parties’ experiences in it.  The corollary to embracing 
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complexity in our research efforts is understanding how these questions and their 
empirical results affect the reality of the civil justice system.  What do the concepts of 
balance of power and expertise mean for access to justice in practice?   
We do not believe that our findings tell us that representatives do not help less 
powerful parties.  In fact, the data shows that, overall, representatives can and do help 
less powerful parties.  But there are some things that some representatives do that may 
not be helpful in certain contexts.  Thus, we think the appropriate conclusion is that 
representation is not monolithic.  Different legal contexts call for different types of 
representation, and for representatives making different strategic choices.  A little 
representation may not be enough to make a difference.  But we cannot assume 
representation needs based on partial information.  Instead, we need to understand how 
the balance of power and expertise interact with the particular legal context, and how that 
translates to the role of representation.  It may be that our theories of strategic expertise 
lead to the conclusion that lay representation, unbundled services, court reform, or 
technology based services are the most effective solutions for particular legal contexts.  
Similarly, it may be that our understanding of the balance of power leads to the 
conclusion that some legal contexts are (or can be designed to be) ones where the parties 
are on equal footing and thus representation is unnecessary or, at the least, a poor use of 
limited resources.  It also may be that some legal contexts require full representation 
because limited representation or non-representative assistance from courts does not 
provide enough expertise to offset an imbalance in power.  It is clear, though, that we do 
not yet understand these phenomena enough to know these contexts when we see them.  
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And we do not have enough understanding to reliably predict when representation will 
matter. 
Beyond the specific questions about representation raised in this article, this 
research project and others like it add to our base of knowledge and understanding 
regarding the real-world operation of civil justice in America—a necessary step in 
solving problems facing the civil justice system.  Despite the recent resurgence of interest 
in access to justice issues, there is still much that we do not know about how the civil 
justice system actually operates.132  Even in the face of ongoing conversations about the 
crisis in civil justice among those who work in the trenches of legal services and on 
access to justice research, it is all too clear that we do not yet have the theory, the data, or 
the analysis needed to change our civil justice system for the better.  Studies such as this 
one advance our understanding of the nuanced dynamics of legal representation and legal 
processes in context.  Just as importantly, this work also increases our understanding of 
what is actually happening, on a day-to-day basis, in our nation’s civil courts.  
  
                                                
132 See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 1, at 117-120 (identifying a lack of information about the demand 
for civil legal services including how individuals understand and interact with law and the justice system). 
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TABLES FOR METHODOLOGY SECTION 
 
Table M1.  Use of Procedures 
  Party Appear Testimony Disclose Introduce Admit when Introduce 
Claimant 
1180 762 336 192 183 
65.8% 42.5% 18.7% 10.7% 95.3% 
Employer 
950 888 850 718 713 
53.0% 49.5% 47.4% 40.2% 99.3% 
Table M2.  Win Rates with Use of Procedures 
  Party Appear Testimony Disclose Introduce Admit when Introduce 
Claimant 
Wins 
903 506 241 119 117 
76.5% 66.4% 71.7% 61.9% 63.9% 
Employer 
Wins 
430 388 337 326 326 
45.3% 43.7% 39.7% 45.4% 45.7% 
Table M3.  Representation Balance 




398 171 Both 
Represented 
227 
.221 .095 0.126 
Employer 
887 660 Neither 
Represented 
736 
.494 .367 0.41 
Total 1285 831   963 
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TABLES FOR FINDINGS SECTION 
 
Table 1:    Claimant Win Rates and Representation 










N=1794, difference in proportions statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
7.82) 
Table 2:    Employer Win Rates and Representation 










N=1794, difference in proportions not statistically significant (z=.50) 
Table 3:    Claimant Win Rates and Representation Advantage 










N=398, difference in proportions statistically significant at .001 level (z=-2.38) 
Table 4:    Employer Win Rates and Representation Advantage 
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N=887, difference in proportions statistically significant at .00 level (z=-4.48) 
Table 5:    Win Rates and Representation Balance 










N=963, difference in proportions statistically significant at .00 level (z=-5.06) 
 
















67 88 12 88 
90.5% 71.5% 41.3% 71.5% 
Employer 
Wins 
7 35 17 35 
9.4% 28.4% 58.9% 28.4% 
Total 
74 123 29 123 
99.9% 99.9% 100.2% 99.9% 
? N= 197, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=3.15) 
N=152, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-3.08) 
Table 7:    Claimant Appearance Rates by Levels of Representation 








Does Not Appear 
Claimant 
Appears 
355 825 343 12 




43 570 8 33 
10.8% 40.9% 2.2% 73.3% 
Total 
398 1396 351 45 
99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 
N=1794, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-11.15) 
N=396, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-5.06) 
Table 8:    Employer Appearance Rates by Levels of Representation  








Does Not Appear 
Employer 
Appears 
552 397 415 185 
62.3% 43.9% 92.2% 34.8% 
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334 508 35 347 
37.6% 56.1% 7.8% 65.2% 
Total 
887 905 450 532 
99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
N=1794, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-7.81) 
N=982, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-18.39) 
Table 9:     Represented Claimant Win Rates Across Claimant Appearance  
  Claimant Appears Claimant Does Not Appear 
Claimant and Rep 
Appear 
Claimant and Rep 
Do Not Appear 
Claimant 
Wins 
299 32 289 5 
84.2% 74.4% 84.2% 50.0% 
Employer 
Wins 
56 11 54 4 
15.7% 25.5% 15.7% 50.0% 
Total 
355 43 343 8 
99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 100.0% 
N=398, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .10 level (z=-1.62) 
N=351, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-2.58) 
Table 10:     Represented Employer Win Rates Across Employer Appearance  
  Employer Appears Employer Does Not Appear 
Employer and Rep 
Appear 
Employer and Rep 
Do Not Appear 
Claimant 
Wins 
295 302 216 29 
53.3% 90.4% 52.0% 82.8% 
Employer 
Wins 
258 32 199 6 
46.6% 9.6% 47.9% 17.1% 
Total 
553 334 415 35 
        
N=887, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-11.42) 
N=450 , difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-3.51) 
Table 11:    Claimant Testimony by Levels of Representation  








Does Not Appear 
Claimant 
Testifies 
214 548 208 6 




184 848 143 39 
46.2% 60.7% 40.7% 86.6% 
Total 
398 1396 351 45 
99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 
N=1794, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-5.16) 
N=396, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-5.82) 
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Table 12:    Employer Testimony by Levels of Representation  








Does Not Appear 
Employer 
Testifies 
512 374 381 123 




375 532 67 289 
41.4% 58.6% 14.9% 70.2% 
Total 
887 906 448 412 
99.2% 100.8% 100.0% 100.1% 
N=1973, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-6.96) 
N=860, difference in proportions statistically 
significant at .00 level (z=-16.42) 
 

































340 526 166 165 162 131 
62.0% 62.0% 77.5% 89.6% 77.8% 91.6% 
Employer 
Wins 
208 322 48 19 46 12 
37.9% 37.9% 22.4% 10.3% 22.2% 8.4% 
Total 548 848 214 184 207 143 
N= 1396, difference in proportions is 
not statistically significant (z=-.01) 
N=398, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .001 level 
(z=3.22) 
N=351, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level 
(z=3.40) 

































219 381 280 316 204 41 
58.4% 71.6% 54.7% 84.5% 53.3% 61.2% 
Employer 
Wins 
156 151 232 58 179 26 
41.6% 28.4% 45.0% 15.5% 46.7% 38.8% 
Total 375 532 512 374 383 67 
N=907, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
.4.14) 
N=886, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
9.33) 
N=450, difference in proportions is 
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Table 15:   Document Disclosure by Levels of Representation 









130 206 587 263 




268 1190 299 644 
67.3% 85.2% 33.7% 71.0% 
Total 398 1396 886 907 
N=1794, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
8.07) 
N=1794, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
15.59) 

























134 732 107 224 95 198 
65.0% 61.0% 82.3% 83.5% 83.3% 83.5% 
Employer 
Wins 
72 458 23 44 19 39 
34.9% 38.5% 17.7% 16.4% 16.6% 16.4% 
Total 206 1190 130 268 114 237 
N=1396, difference in proportions not 
statistically significant (z=-.96) 
N=398, difference in proportions not 
statistically significant (z=.318) 
N=351, difference in proportions not 
statistically significant (z=.049) 



























163 437 350 247 214 31 
61.9% 67.9% 59.6% 82.3% 52.9% 67.3% 
Employer 
Wins 
100 207 237 53 190 15 
38.0% 32.1% 40.3% 17.6% 47.0% 32.6% 
Total 263 644 587 300 404 46 
N=907, difference in proportions 
statistically significant at .09 level (z=-
1.69) 
N=887, difference in proportions 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
6.79) 
N=450, difference in proportions 
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Table 18:    Document Introduction by Levels of Representation 









75 117 465 253 




323 1279 422 654 
81.1% 19.6% 47.5% 72.1% 
Total 398 1396 887 907 
N=1794, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
5.96) 
N=1794, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
10.6) 



























64 802 55 276 54 239 
54.7% 62.7% 73.3% 85.4% 73.9% 85.9% 
Employer 
Wins 
53 477 20 47 19 39 
45.3% 37.8% 26.6% 14.5% 26.0% 14.0% 
Total 117 1279 75 323 73 278 
N=1396, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .08 level 
(z=1.71) 
N=398, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .01 level 
(z=2.52) 
N=351, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .01 level 
(z=2.45) 



























142 458 250 347 193 52 
56.1% 70.0% 53.7% 82.2% 53.1% 59.7% 
Employer 
Wins 
111 196 215 75 170 35 
43.8% 29.9% 46.2% 17.8% 46.8% 40.2% 
Total 253 654 465 421 363 87 
? N=907, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level 
(z=3.96) 
N=886, difference in proportions is 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
9.00) 
N=450, difference in proportions is 
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Not Use Step 
Claimant 
Wins 
167 699 134 197 
63.3% 61.7% 81.2% 84.5% 
Employer 
Wins 
97 433 31 36 
36.7% 38.2% 18.8% 15.5% 
Total 264 1132 233 165 
N=1396, difference in proportions is not 
statistically significant (z=-.45) 
N=398, difference in proportions is not 
statistically significant (z=.88) 













Not Use Step 
Claimant 
Wins 
200 400 400 196 
60.4% 69.4% 60.2% 88.3% ?
Employer 
Wins 
131 176 264 26 
39.5% 30.6% 39.8% 11.7% 
Total 331 576 664 222 
 
N=907, difference in proportions 
statistically significant at .005 level (z=-
2.76) 
N=886, difference in proportions 
statistically significant at .00 level (z=-
7.71) 
 
